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INTRODUCTION 
In the world of charitable organizations in the United States, 
donations are big business. In 2015, it was estimated that private 
individuals donated over $350 billion, which accounted for 
approximately two percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.1 While 
impressive, this figure represents a somewhat static donation pie, as the 
number of individual donations has not increased in the past few years, 
and neither has the percentage.2 Since the 1970s, the percentage of 
giving has consistently remained at around two percent (peaking to 2.3 
percent in 2001).3 At the same time, the number of charitable 
organizations registered with the U.S. government has grown quickly 
over the last decade.4 This means that although there is a lot of money 
available, the competition for donations increases each year. Therefore, 
it should come as no surprise that many charitable organizations have 
turned to branding and trademarks in order to increase their ability to 
capture a bigger share of the available dollars.5 
Branding gives charities the ability to tell a story in a single 
trademark.6 Instead of just signing up for any old 5K run and happening 
to wear a pink shirt, you are now part of a community that is running 
“For the Cure.”7 As one of the larger charitable organizations to embrace 
branding, the Susan G. Komen Foundation (the “Komen Foundation”) 
knows that being able to create a culture around one’s mission increases 
1. See CHARITY NAVIGATOR, Giving Statistics, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index. 
cfm/bay/content.view/cpid/42 (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
2. See Holly Hall, Eden Stiffman, Ron Coddington & Meredith Myers, Philanthropy surges
5.4% to Record $358 Billion, Says ‘Giving USA’, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (2015), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/interactives/giving-usa-2015. Individual contributions in 2015 only 
increased 0.1 percent over 2014. Id. See also Suzanne Perry, The Stubborn 2% Rate, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY (Jun 17, 2013), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-
Rate/154691.  
3. Perry, supra note 3.
4.  Brice S. McKeever, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2015, URBAN INSTITUTE, 2 (Oct.
2015), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/nonprofit-sector-brief-2015-public-charities-
giving-and-volunteering (reporting that the number of nonprofit organizations increased by almost
three percent from 2003 to 2013). From 2013 to 2015, the number of public charities increased from
954,476 to 976,948, an increase of approximately two percent. See id., I.R.S. Pub. 78 (2015).
5. See Josh Gerben, Why Your Nonprofit Should Obtain a Trademark for Its Name, 
NONPROFITPRO (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nonprofitpro.com/post/nonprofit-obtain-trademark-
name. 
6. See Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 983 (2012);
Katya Assaf, Brand Fettishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 85 (2010). 
7.  See Find a Race, SUSAN G. KOMEN RACE FOR THE CURE, 
http://apps.komen.org/raceforthecure/?utm_source=komen.org&utm_medium=ParticiapteLandingP
age&utm_campaign=FindARace (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
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public giving; from 2010 to 2011, public contributions increased from 
approximately $365 million to over $419 million.8 Relatedly, the 
embracement of branding has also led to the increased use of trademark 
law to enforce the brand and marks and, unfortunately at times, over-
enforcement by large entities. For example, in 2010 the Komen 
Foundation was lampooned in the media for being a trademark bully due 
to its over-enforcement efforts of its trademark rights to “For the Cure”.9 
Although trademark bullying in the for-profit sector leads to serious 
negative consequences for society, this is particularly the case in the 
nonprofit sector. 
Enforcement of legal rights imposes costs on the entities involved 
in a dispute, but also on society itself.10 Although many charitable 
organizations claim that they attempt to resolve trademark infringement 
disputes in an amicable, non-litigious manner, this may not always be 
possible.11 Once an organization sends a cease-and-desist letter to a 
target, the target may decide to bring a declaratory judgment action 
against the letter sender, like in FreecycleSunnyvale v. The Freecycle 
Network.12 It is likely that The Freecycle Network had no desire to 
litigate its infringement claim against FreecycleSunnyvale, but in the end 
it had to, all the way to the Ninth Circuit.13 Legal fees spent on 
trademark enforcement, litigation or otherwise, equates to less money 
8. Ernst & Young, Consolidated Financial Statements and Supplemental Financial 
Information, The Susan G. Komen Foundation, Inc., dba Susan G. Komen for the Cure and 
Affiliates, Years Ended March 31, 2011 and 2010, With Report of Independent Auditors, 3 
http://ww5.komen.org/uploadedFiles/Content/AboutUs/Financial/2011%20Komen%20Financial%2
0Statements%20FINAL(3).pdf.  
9. Clifford M. Marks, Charity Brawl: Nonprofits Aren’t So Generous When a Name’s at
Stake, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703700904575390950178142586; Laura Bassett, Susan G. Komen Foundation 
Elbows Out Other Charities Over Use of the Word ‘Cure’, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/komen-foundation-charities-cure_n_793176.html; The 
Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.cc.com/video-
clips/7b084t/the-colbert-report-tip-wag—-susan-g—komen-foundation—-spider-man-musical. 
10. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997); Richard A. Posner, The Cost of 
Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—And for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 
(1996). 
11. Eric T. Rosenthal, Komen ‘For the Cure’ Trademark Protection Ignites Ire of Some
Breast Cancer Bloggers, ONCOLOGY TIMES (Dec. 31, 2010), http://mobile.journals.lww.com/
oncology-times/_layouts/15/oaks.journals.mobile/post.aspx?blogId=2&postId=92 (citing Mr. 
Blum’s statement that “Komen has never sued any nonprofit over trademark infringement”). 
12. Freecyclesunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, Inc., No. C 06-00324 CW, 2006 WL 2827916
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2006). 
13. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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being available to further the mission of the charitable organization.14 
Not only that, but there are intangible harms that over-enforcement 
brings in the nonprofit sector, including an increase in costs and a 
reduction in the number of smaller charitable entities. These harms are a 
serious concern because the success of any one charitable organization at 
the expense of another may channel funding into a particular area of 
concern for a portion of society, while leaving other areas underfunded 
or without funding altogether.15 
As I have explored in previous work,16 the blame for this over-
enforcement of trademark rights can be in large part laid at the steps of 
expanded rights under the federal trademark law, the Lanham Act.17 
Since the 1960s, amendments to the Lanham Act and judicial 
interpretation of the law have led to an ever-increasing expansion of the 
scope of trademark rights.18 In the nonprofit space, this has led to cases 
where the preferred winners of infringement cases are large, well-
established organizations rather than smaller entities.19 At the same time, 
case law suggests that charitable organizations need to be just as vigilant 
with their trademark enforcement efforts as for-profit entities, or else 
face charges of abandonment.20 All of this encourages large charitable 
organizations to over-enforce their trademarks, particularly against 
smaller entities. This is not to say that there are no legitimate reasons for 
charitable organizations to enforce their trademark rights, such as when 
fraudulent entities pass themselves off as the original charitable 
organization and divert donations.21 Rather, action needs to be taken to 
stop the counter-productive cycle of over-enforcement so that charitable 
organizations can focus on serious cases of infringement and reserve 
14. See Bassett, supra note 10 (citing to Komen’s spending of over one million dollars on
legal fees). See also CNN Wire, Keystone Wounded Warriors Sued for ‘Unfair Competition’ by 
Wounded Warrior Project, FOX43 (May 12, 2015, 10:51PM), 
http://fox43.com/2015/05/12/keystone-wounded-warriors-sued-for-unfair-competition-by-wounded-
warrior-project/ (citing founder of Keystone Wounded Warriors’ statement that “what is most 
unfortunate is that both charities have spent money in court that could have been better used helping 
veterans”). 
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Contracting Trademark Fame?, 47 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J. 1291, 
1305-13 (2016); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 632-40 
[hereinafter Grinvald, Shaming].  
17. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-459, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
18. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 409,
429 (2015) [hereinafter Grinvald, Policing]. 
19. See infra Part II.B.1. 
20. See infra Part II.B.2. 
21. See infra Part II.A.
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their resources for their charitable missions. 
To this end, I suggest that one realistic solution judges could adopt 
is to require that trademark infringement pleadings include plausible 
allegations of defendant’s deceit, as well as plausible allegations of 
source confusion.22 With these two heightened pleading requirements, 
the typical charitable organization trademark infringement lawsuit would 
be narrowed to the type that produces real harms to charitable 
organizationsfraudulent entities whose intention is to divert donations. 
In addition, due to unique attributes of charitable organizations, I revisit 
a suggestion that I made in an earlier work, Shaming Trademark 
Bullies.23 I suggest that charitable organizations may be particularly 
susceptible to public shaming for trademark over-enforcement. Since 
charities rely on the public’s goodwill for donations, the reputational 
damage that responsible shaming can bring to a charitable organization 
may act as a dampener for future over-enforcement.24 
The structure of my Article is as follows. In Part I, I explore 
branding and trademarks in the charitable organization context and 
examine the rise of “charitable brands.” I also examine how enforcement 
has led to over-enforcement and the serious harms that stem from this 
charitable trademark bullying. I turn in Part II to a discussion of why this 
over-enforcement may be occurring, and I argue that judicial 
interpretation of the Lanham Act is in large part to blame. I discuss the 
legal expansions that have taken place within trademark law over the last 
century, as well as some of the main cases involving charitable 
organizations that may be encouraging trademark bullying. Against this 
backdrop, I propose my solutions in Part III, beginning with a set of 
suggestions, as briefly outlined above, to take in the judicial setting and 
then turn to my discussion of shaming in the nonprofit space. I will then 
briefly conclude. 
I. CHARITABLE BRANDS
The history of charities and the promotion of charitable giving in 
22. See infra Part III.A. Suggesting that actionable confusion be limited to source confusion
revisits the same suggestion previously made by Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna. 
Mark Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (arguing that 
courts should require actionable confusion to be limited to source confusion). In addition, Professors 
McKenna and William McGeveran have argued that “confusion isn’t everything,” proposing 
(among other proposals) that courts reduce the role of confusion in trademark infringement cases. 
William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
253, 256 (2013). 
23. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 625. 
24. See infra Part III.B.
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the United States is a long one.25 The oldest surviving public charity in 
the U.S. was founded in 1657,26 and from an early period, the U.S. 
government encouraged such charities to exist and flourish.27 This 
encouragement came through the form of tax relief, with the earliest 
reference to public charities’ tax exempt status found in the 1894 Tax 
Act and then again in the 1909 Revenue Act.28 Although the U.S. 
government taxed corporations, it exempted public charities from this 
requirement.29 In addition, to encourage donations, the 1917 Revenue 
Act allowed for individual tax deductions for the amounts given to tax-
exempt public charities.30 While the language and requirements for tax 
exempt status has changed over the years, the basic principle of 
encouraging the existence and support of charitable organizations 
remains in the Internal Revenue Code today, embodied in Sections 
501(c)(3) and (c)(4).31 
Currently, there are over 1.5 million nonprofit organizations 
registered with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pursuant to 
these sections.32 As an aggregate, these nonprofit organizations represent 
approximately five percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product, 
contributing $905 billion to the U.S economy in 2013.33 That being said, 
the word “nonprofit” is an umbrella term that captures a myriad of 
different types of entities.34 In this Article, I will be focusing on one 
particular type of nonprofit, the “public charity,” or those that are 
registered with the I.R.S. under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
25. See OLIVIER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 8 (2014).
26. See Rick Cohen, Infographic: Some UK Charities Don’t Want to Replicate U.S.
Charitable System, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (Mar. 4, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2014/03/04/infographic-some-uk-charities-don-t-want-to-replicate-u-s-charitable-system/ 
(identifying the oldest public charity in the United States as having been established in 1657). This 
is the Scots’ Charitable Society of Boston. See SCOT’S CHARITABLE SOCIETY, https://scots-
charitable.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (referring to themselves as “the oldest charitable 
organization still existing in the Western Hemisphere”). 
27. See PAUL ARNSBERGER, MELISSA LUDLUM, MARGARET RILEY & MARK STANTON, A 
HISTORY OF THE TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR: AN SOI PERSPECTIVE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 
105 (Winter 2008). 
28. Id. at 106. 
29. ZUNZ, supra note 26, at 10. 
30. Id. 
31. INT. REV. CODE (West 2016). 
32. Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS,
http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (citing 1,571,056 tax-
exempt organizations).  
33. McKeever, supra note 5, at 1. 
34. See Exempt Purposes – Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-purposes-internal-
revenue-code-section-501c3 (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
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Revenue Code.35 Public charities typically rely on donations to support 
their charitable work.36 As examples, over ninety-five percent of the 
Komen Foundation’s annual revenue in 2015 and seventy-six percent of 
Livestrong’s 2014 annual revenue came from public contributions.37 
Although there is a lot of money at stake with public donations, 
there is also fierce competition for this money due to a variety of 
reasons.38 For one, the number of entities competing for such donations 
is increasing. From 2003 to 2013, public charities increased 
approximately 19.5 percent from 798,988 registered entities to 
954,476.39 And in 2015, the number of registered public charities 
increased to 976,948, which represents approximately a two-percent 
increase from 2013.40 Another reason for fierce competition is that there 
are quite a number of different entities, such as human services, arts, 
education, health services, public-benefit, and religious, that all compete 
for the same pool of funds.41 In order to more effectively compete for 
this limited amount of money, many public charities have increased their 
marketing efforts.42 This has included the greater use of branding and 
trademarks, which will be explored in Part A below. In Parts B and C, a 
related phenomenon of over-enforcement of a charity’s trademark and 
the harms such over-enforcement causes will be addressed. 
A. The Rise of the “Charitable Brand”
Branding is more than one’s trademark: “[a] brand is a
psychological construct in the minds of all those aware of the branded 
35. Public charities are defined by the I.R.S. as “churches, hospitals, qualified medical
research organizations affiliated with hospitals, schools, colleges and universities, [that] [h]ave an 
active program of fundraising and receive contributions from many sources, including the general 
public, governmental agencies, corporations, private foundations or other public charities.” Public 
Charities, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/public-charities 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
36. Bijetri Bose, Effects of Competition on Charitable Donations, 1
https://econ.washington.edu/sites/econ/files/old-site-uploads/2014/11/Bose_jmpaper.pdf. 
37. See 2014 I.R.S. Form 990, SUSAN G. KOMEN 15, http://ww5.komen.org/
uploadedFiles/_Komen/Content/About_Us/Financial_Reports/Komen_Parent_990_FYE_3-31-
15_PIC_Signed_Copy_with_efile_acceptance.pdf; 2014 Form 990, Schedule A, THE LIVESTRONG
FOUNDATION 2, http://images.livestrong.org/downloads/flatfiles/who-we-are/our-strength/financial-
info/2014_Form_990_Livestrong_Foundation.pdf. 
38. See Bose, supra note 37, at 1. 
39. McKeever, supra note 5, at 3. 
40. I.R.S. Pub. 78 (2015). 
41. See the numbers – ‘Giving USA 2016’ Infographic, GIVING USA (June 23, 2016),
http://givingusa.org/see-the-numbers-giving-usa-2016-infographic/. 
42. Bose, supra note 37, at 2. 
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product, person, organization, or movement.”43 Professor Deven Desai 
sums it up succinctly with an example of Coke: “Coke’s brand also has 
an emotional, symbolic component, as the brand evokes a sense of being 
all-American, ‘Classic,’ and the perfect refreshing drink, whether it is 
the Fourth of July or Christmas. A sip of Coke means imbibing an entire 
culture.”44 Branding is used to distinguish oneself from competitors and 
to attempt to bond consumers to the branded entity for life.45 An 
example of this can be seen in Samsung’s advertisements of its Galaxy 
phones.46 To differentiate itself from the Apple brand and its product, 
the ubiquitous iPhone, Samsung ran a series of commercials where it 
positions its customers (and by extension itself) as young, hip, and fun-
loving.47 In fact, in a number of different commercials, Samsung sends 
the message that if you’re young (or even young at heart) you will have 
a Samsung Galaxy instead of an iPhone.48 
In contrast to for-profit entities, charitable organizations are 
latecomers to the trademark and branding space. Although charitable 
organizations have long been aware of the need to prevent fraudulent 
uses of names similar to their own,49 the acknowledgement of the 
importance of an organization’s name as a trademark, and further as a 
brand, has only been around since the 1960s and 1990s, respectively.50 
Although the 1946 Lanham Act gave all entities, including charitable 
43. Nathalie Kylander & Christopher Stone, The Role of Brand in the Nonprofit Sector, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2012, http://ssir.org/articles/entry/
the_role_of_brand_in_the_nonprofit_sector. 
44. Desai, supra note 7, at 983. 
45. Id. at 990 (“Many companies encourage consumers to see a brand as having a personality 
and to accept the idea that owning a branded good connects the consumer to the brand in some deep, 
personal way.”). 
46. See Samsung Mobile USA, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user/
samsungmobileusa/videos (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
 47.  See, e.g., Samsung Galaxy S7: Champagne Calls, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5aF23XpBwU (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
48. Samsung Makes Fun of Apple! In New Commercial, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKunpnL4g0w (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (showing the young 
graduates at the pool party with the Samsung smartphone and the older parents with the iPhone). 
Samsung’s advertising campaign appears to have paid off, as it was ranked as the number one 
trusted brand with Millennials. See Chris Matyszczyk, You’ll Never Guess Which Brand Millennials 
Trust the Most, INC. (June 9, 2016), http://www.inc.com/chris-matyszczyk/youll-never-guess-
which-brand-millennials-trust-the-most.html. 
49. See, e.g., In re First Presbyterian Church of Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. 240, 1858 WL 7632
(Pa. 1858) (holding that a second-comer Presbyterian Church of Harrisburg would confuse the 
public). 
50. I base this “acknowledgement” on the apparent rise in trademark registrations for
charitable name marks with the USPTO office in the 1960s (statistics on file with author) and in the 
rise of nonprofit branding literature in the 1990s. See infra note 56. 
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organizations, the right to register their distinctive names as trademarks, 
many did not take advantage of this until after approximately the 1960s. 
It was in around the 1960s that records showed charitable organizations 
began to register their trademarks in greater numbers with the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office.51 While trademark registration is not a 
prerequisite for protection in the U.S., registration is a sign that an entity 
is taking its trademark rights more seriously.52 In particular, a federally 
registered trademark gives its holder a nationally-recognized right to the 
mark without having to use the mark in all jurisdictions of the U.S.53 
Without a federally-registered trademark, an entity needs to rely on more 
narrowly-circumscribed common law to protect its trademark.54 
The rise of the charitable brand came even later, appearing in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. This can be seen through a number of different 
sources, including the appearance of industry journals and articles 
discussing the idea of branding.55 This late start to branding may stem 
from the fact that branding was seen as more of a commercial corporate 
marketing idea rather than a nonprofit one.56 However, with the 
increased need to fundraise even during economic downturns, along with 
rising numbers of nonprofit employees who once worked in the 
corporate world, many large charitable organizations have embraced the 
concept of branding.57 This embracement of branding is most visible in 
the healthcare type of public charity. These organizations raise public 
funds for medically related causes such as cancer, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, 
51. See Statistics on File with Author. For example, a number of well-established charities
did not file for a trademark registration until the 1960s. See, e.g., The Salvation Army, Registration 
No. 0807044 (issued Apr. 12, 1966). 
52. See Gerben, supra note 6. 
53. See 15 U.S.C.A. §1057(c) (West 2010). 
54. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“It results that
the adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the absence of some valid legislation enacted for 
the purpose, project the right of protection in advance of the extension of the trade, or operate as a 
claim of territorial rights over areas into which it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the 
trade.”).  
55. See Information for and About Nonprofit Organizations, Top Nonprofit Journals,
http://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g=283253&p=1886821 (listing various nonprofit journals that 
began in the late 1980s and 1990s). For example, the International Journal of Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Marketing began in 1999 and is focused on marketing in the nonprofit sector. See 
Mirlyn Catalog, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, Subjects, 
https://mirlyn.lib.umich.edu/Record/004371474/Subjects#tabs (last visited June 20, 2017). 
56. See Kylander & Stone, supra note 44 (“The models and terminology used in the
nonprofit sector to understand brand remain those imported from the for-profit sector to boost name 
recognition and raise revenue.”).  
57. See Alan Tapp, Charity Brands: A Qualitative Study of Current Practice, 1 J. NONPROFIT 
& VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING 328, 328 (1996). 
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Parkinson’s, diabetes, and birth defects, just to name a few.58 
Interestingly, this type of organization appears to have a high number of 
competitors, which may explain the prevalence of strong brands within 
this sector.59 
The charitable brand has meant not only designing an evocative 
logo that lets potential donors know to whom they are donating, but also 
implementing a psychological connection with donors.60 This 
psychological connection is strengthened through story-telling. For 
example, many charitable organizations’ marketing pamphlets contain 
stories about the real-life people, animals, or nature preserves that the 
donors’ funds are going toward.61 Through these stories, charitable 
brands are conveying trust (we are using your money to help person A) 
and evoking emotion (person A’s life was saved because of you), both of 
which are keys in fostering the psychological connection.62 Just as with 
for-profit brands, charitable brands’ efforts can tie their donors to the 
brand and create an everlasting cycle of donations through loyalty.63 
Related to the rise of the charitable brand and a greater use of the 
trademark registration system is an increased rise in trademark 
enforcement efforts. The full extent to which such enforcement efforts 
have increased is unclear, as much of trademark enforcement is done 
extra-judicially through cease-and-desist letters or even more informally 
through phone calls.64 However, there has been what appears to be a 
statistically significant increase in enforcement efforts since the early 
2000s.65 Although enforcement efforts in the for-profit sector have also 
increased, the increase in efforts in the nonprofit sector is telling 
58. See, e.g., AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer.org (For an overview of
Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, see What is Hodgkin’s Lymphoma?, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/hodgkin-lymphoma/about/what-is-hodgkin-disease.html (last updated 
Mar. 28, 2017); PARKINSON’S DISEASE FOUNDATION, http://www.pdf.org/; AMERICAN DIABETES 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.diabetes.org/; MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.org/. 
59. See 2016 Harris Poll EquiTrend Rankings, THE HARRIS POLL (2016), 
http://www.theharrispoll.com/equitrend-rankings/2016#Non-Profits (ranking thirteen health 
nonprofits versus around five nonprofits in other categories).  
60. See Kylander & Stone, supra note 44.
61. See, e.g., LIVESTRONG FOUNDATION, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 1-5, 
http://images.livestrong.org/downloads/flatfiles/who-we-are/our-strength/financial-
info/LIVESTRONG_2014AR.pdf (highlighting stories of supporters of, and instructors in, 
Livestrong programs). 
62. See Tapp, supra note 58, at 331. 
63. See id.
64. See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 41. 
65. LexMachina.com (conduct a quick search using the term “nonprofit” and narrow to
trademark only cases). The case numbers grew from three in 2005 to forty-seven in 2010. 
LexMachina search results on file with author. 
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because, of the two sectors, the nonprofit sector is the least likely to be 
able to afford such efforts. The next section will discuss this rise in 
enforcement efforts, which have unfortunately led at times to over-
enforcement. 
B. Enforcement Efforts Leading to Over-Enforcement
As mentioned previously, charitable organizations are not new to
the enforcement arena. One of the oldest documented disputes relating to 
a charitable organization is from 1858, when the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied a charter to the First Presbyterian Church of 
Harrisburg on the grounds that it was too similar to an older church, The 
English Presbyterian Congregation of Harrisburg.66 Interestingly, the 
court held that the similarities were not necessarily in the way the formal 
names were registered, but in the manner in which the public referred to 
the older church as the “Presbyterian Church in Harrisburg.”67 This was 
enough to find the potential for confusion, as the court seems to be 
hypothesizing about how the public would perceive the two 
congregations.68 Cases from the same era are similar in nature and 
mirror disputes from the commercial sector, which are those centered 
around entities using the same name (or a very similar sounding name) 
for the same purpose.69 One reason for this is that the law of unfair 
competition (the grounds on which these cases were typically decided) 
and, by extension, trademark law, was narrowly applied, which likely 
disincentivized cases based on broader infringement theories.70 I will 
discuss in more depth how the law encourages trademark enforcement 
efforts in Part II below. 
Looking at the reported cases, it appears that formal (and by 
extension, informal) trademark enforcement began to increase in the 
1980s.71 While from the time period of 1858 to 1979 there was an 
average of 1.76 cases per decade involving trademark-related disputes, 
66. First Presbyterian Church of Harrisburg, 2 Grant 240, 1858 WL 7632 (Pa. 1858). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Colonial Dames of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New York, 60
N.Y.S. 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899) [hereinafter Colonial Dames]; In re Duquesne College, 2 Pa. D. 
555 (Pa. 1891) [hereinafter Duquesne]. 
70. In addition, it is likely, as it is today, that many disputes never make it to the litigation
stage and are settled informally and extra-judicially. See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 416-
18. 
71. Westlaw (search with the string, “advanced: charit! & DA(aft 12-31-1979 & bef 01-01-
1990) & “trademark”“) returns eighteen relevant cases.  
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in the 1980s alone, there were at least sixteen.72 This increase in 
enforcement appears to track the rise in public awareness of charitable 
organizations and attention to the need for public donations due to a cut 
in government services.73 As such, the market for public donations 
heated up in the 1980s, and competition typically brings increased 
strife.74 
Some of this strife is required in a way, as there are situations 
where a third-party entity is intentionally utilizing a charitable 
organization’s name or similar name for fraudulent purposes. The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) attempts to police these types of 
fraudulent entities and educate the public about them, but the party best 
situated to enforce (or report to the FTC) is the charitable organization 
itself.75 A related type of required enforcement practice is seen where a 
third-party entity does not adopt its name for the intentional purpose of 
misleading the public, but it has the effect of doing so, and the third-
party entity takes no action to stop it. 
This was the case in the dispute between WWP, Inc. and Wounded 
Warriors Family Support, Inc.76 WWP, Inc. (doing business as the 
Wounded Warriors Project) was established in 2002 in Florida, and 
Wounded Warriors Family Support (Family Support) was established in 
2003 in Germany. In 2004, Family Support re-incorporated in the U.S. 
and started a new website, woundedwarriors.org.77 Prior to this move 
and new website, Family Support’s average monthly contribution had 
been $1,337. After the move and site launch, that amount jumped to 
$87,895 per month.78 Unfortunately, a good portion of this amount was 
due to confusion on the part of donors as to which entity they were 
donating. In 2007, Wounded Warriors Project brought a lawsuit against 
Family Support and won a jury verdict with a fairly large damages 
award, which was later affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.79 
What makes the Wounded Warriors Project case “required” 
enforcement is not just the similarity in names and the competition 
72. Statistics on file with author. 
73. See Elizabeth T. Boris, Myths About the Nonprofit Sector, in 4 CHARTING CIVIL SOCIETY 
1 (July 1998). 
74. See Bose, supra note 37, at 1. 
75. Charity Scams, FTC, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0011-charity-scams 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
76. WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc., 628 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2011). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2008); Wounded 
Warriors Family Support, 628 F.3d 1032. 
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between the two organizations for donation funds. In fact, while Family 
Support was still based in Germany, Wounded Warrior Project asked if 
Family Support wanted any marketing assistance, which is indicative of 
the ability of two different organizations with two similar names to work 
together for similar causes.80 In addition, “wounded warrior” is a generic 
term that is used in the military to refer to injured soldiers.81 Rather, 
what makes this case “required” enforcement was that even once aware 
of the potential for confusion, Family Support made no apparent efforts 
to ensure that donations intended for Wounded Warrior Project were re-
routed to the Wounded Warrior Project.82 In addition, Family Support 
made no efforts to educate the public regarding the differences between 
the organizations.83 Instead, Family Support appeared to have simply 
cashed any and all checks that were mailed to it, regardless of whether 
there were obvious signs that a donation was not intended for Family 
Support.84 Therefore, it appears that while Family Support did not start 
out with the intent to deceive the public, the effect was to defraud the 
public by not taking actions to reverse the deception. 
While Wounded Warriors Project is a case of good enforcement, 
unfortunately, it appears that WWP, like some other large charitable 
organizations, has begun to take enforcement efforts too far. WWP, the 
Komen Foundation, and Livestrong, to name a few, have been described 
as “trademark bullies.”85 I have defined trademark bullying in previous 
work as “the enforcement of an unreasonable interpretation by a large 
corporation of its trademark rights against a small business or individual 
through the use of intimidation tactics.”86 Although I applied this 
definition to the for-profit sector in my previous work, the same 
definition holds true in the nonprofit sector. Large charitable 
organizations have been targeting smaller nonprofits in an attempt to 
enforce unreasonable interpretations of their trademark rights against 
these smaller entities in an intimidating manner. 
For example, in 2010, the Komen Foundation began a campaign to 
enforce its trademarks against smaller, unrelated entities that use their 
80. Wounded Warriors Family Support, 628 F.3d at 1036. 
81. Ruth McCambridge, Is Wounded Warrior Project a ‘Neighborhood Bully’ Among 
Veterans’ Groups?, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (May 5, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2015/05/05/is-wounded-warrior-project-a-neighborhood-bully-among-veterans-groups/. 
82. Wounded Warriors Family Support, 628 F.3d at 1036-37. 
83. The court called the disclaimer that Family Support had on their website as “anemic.” Id. 
at 1042. 
84. Id. at 1037.
85. See McCambridge, supra note 82. 
86. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 642. 
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“for a Cure” or “for the Cure” language.87 What makes this trademark 
enforcement bullying behavior is that the Komen Foundation is a large 
organization88 targeting smaller charitable organizations through the use 
of the opposition procedure at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
(USPTO), as well as by sending intimidating cease-and-desist letters.89 
Although the General Counsel of the Komen Foundation describes their 
enforcement tactics as “nice,” the perception of intimidation is present 
when a small nonprofit is on the other side of the letter. This is 
particularly the case where the small nonprofit is volunteer-based, like 
“Mush for a Cure,” whose founder reported that she “had to call the 
trademark helpline, because I had no idea what I was doing.”90 In 
addition, the Komen Foundation has been attempting to enforce an 
unreasonable interpretation of their trademark: although their marks are 
“Susan G. Komen For the Cure,”91 “Race for the Cure,”92 and “For the 
Cure,”93 a number of their enforcement efforts have been over variations 
such as “for a Cure.”94 Further, the “For the Cure” mark, which is what 
provides the Komen Foundation with the ability to claim a limited 
exclusive right in such phrase, is registered in International Class 016, 
specifically for “Newsletters on the subject of breast cancer research and 
issues related thereto.”95 All of the other marks that the Komen 
Foundation has taken issue with thus far have been in International Class 
036, the class of products used for charitable fundraising services.96 
Much, if not most, of this bullying occurs extra-judicially, as many 
of these enforcement actions take place through cease-and-desist letters 
and never make it to the litigation stage.97 The reason for this is that for 
the most part, smaller charitable organizations do not have the resources 
to fight back against a trademark bully.98 For example, when the 
87. See Bassett, supra note 10 (reporting from 2010). But it appears that the Komen
Foundation was bullying other organizations as early as 2008. See Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board Inquiry System, TTABVUE (Query: 75724729) (showing results for all oppositions where 
“For the Cure” is used as grounds to oppose other trademark applications) (on file with author). 
88. See 2014 I.R.S. Form 990, supra note 38. In 2015, the Komen Foundation had over $254
million in net revenue and maintained over $177 million in assets.  
89. See Bassett, supra note 10 (reporting reactions from targeted small charities upon
receiving the Komen Foundation’s cease-and-desist letters). 
90. Id. 
91. SUSAN G. KOMEN FOR THE CURE, Registration No. 3,309,532. 
92. RACE FOR THE CURE, Registration No. 1,593,469. 
93. FOR THE CURE, Registration No. 2,362,027. 
94. See TTABVUE results, supra note 88. 
95. FOR THE CURE, supra note 94. 
96. See TTABVUE results, supra note 88.
97. See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 418. 
98. Many smaller charitable organizations operate on a volunteer basis, with all the funds
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Sunshine Kids Foundation, a Texas-based charity focused on children’s 
cancer causes, sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Sunshine Kids Club of 
California, a new charity focused on helping children with cerebral 
palsy, the smaller California entity decided to simply change its name 
after negotiations with the larger Texas entity broke down.99 However, 
even when a smaller entity decides to forego a legal battle with a larger 
entity, there are still costs associated with a name change. As the founder 
of Sunshine Kids Club of California stated, “It’s a lot of work to rebrand 
yourself.”100 In addition, the non-judicial nature of these disputes is 
misleading, as a number of these disputes are in the form of oppositions 
filed in the USPTO. For example, the Komen Foundation has filed at 
least seventeen oppositions to other applications that use “for a Cure” in 
their mark. Although opposition proceedings at the USPTO are not as 
expensive as full-blown litigation, there are still legal costs involved in 
defending a registration application.101 
Even when targeted entities want to fight back against a charitable 
trademark bully, they may not have the resources to fight all the way to 
the end. Once litigation has begun, it is hard to extricate yourself from 
it.102 If an entity is sued in court, it must mount a legal defense or face a 
default judgment.103 Default judgments can happen even if the founders 
of the nonprofit attempt to defend the lawsuit pro se, as entities are not 
allowed to defend themselves pro se; only individuals may do so.104 
Unless the charitable organization can find pro bono counsel, it is likely 
that a lawsuit will mean the organization will need to change its name.105 
For example, Keystone Wounded Warriors utilized $72,000 over the 
course of two years to fight back against WWP out of an annual budget 
raised going towards funding the services of the organization. See WOMEN 4 WOUNDED WARRIORS, 
http://womenforwoundedwarriors.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (“100% Dedication – 100% 
Volunteer – 100% of dollars donated go to the cause. We don’t spend or waste your donations. All 
of the money and goods go directly to those in need.”).  
99. See Marks, supra note 10. 
100. See id. (quoting founder of Sunshine Kids California). 
101. See Paul F. Kilmer, The Value Equation of Trademark Oppositions: A Multinational
Comparison of Costs and Perceived Benefits, 68 INTA BULLETIN 5 (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TheValueEquationofTrademarkOppositionsAMultinationa
lComparisonofCostsandPerceivedBenefits.aspx. 
102. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 647. 
103. See Rebecca Callahan, Arbitration v. Litigation: The Right to Appeal and Other
Misperceptions Fueling the Preference for a Judicial Forum, at 7–8 (Bepress, Legal Series, Paper 
No. 1248, 2006). 
104. Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a
corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”). 
105. See Marks, supra note 10 (referencing the HEADstrong dispute with Livestrong).
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of approximately $200,000.106 In the end, it had to settle and change its 
name to Keystone Warriors.107 
In the next section, I argue that the costs caused by trademark over-
enforcement in the nonprofit sector are serious. The two harms I discuss 
as being particularly serious are the increase in costs, legal and nonlegal, 
both to society and to the individual charitable organizations, in addition 
to the reduction in the number of charitable organizations. An increase in 
costs burdens smaller organizations asymmetrically, with smaller 
charities needing to utilize a greater percentage of their revenue for legal 
costs. Additionally, smaller organizations are more likely to be burdened 
with nonlegal costs, such as the emotional strain that comes with legal 
wrangling. Further, a reduction in the number of charitable organizations 
is alarming because smaller charities play an essential role in society. It 
is oftentimes the smaller charitable organizations that champion less 
well-known causes, such as orphan diseases, or unpopular conditions, 
like mental health. These smaller organizations also play a 
complementary role to larger entities, providing different but related 
services, as well as serving local needs. Therefore, I argue that we 
should be particularly cognizant of the harms that charitable trademark 
bullies produce. 
C. Counterproductive Charitable Trademarks
Abusive enforcement of legal rights, whether judicially or non-
judicially, causes a number of externalities that society is forced to 
absorb.108 I have argued previously that these costs in the for-profit 
sector include increased operating and societal costs, a reduction in 
marketplace competition, and a reduction in the freedom of speech.109 In 
the non-profit sector, similar harms plague society, which I will discuss 
below. 
1. Increased Costs
One of the hidden harms that stems from abusive enforcement of
106. Wounded Warrior Project, Inc. v. Keystone Wounded Warrior, Case No. 5:14-CV-05565 
(E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 29, 2014). 
107. Keystone Warriors, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/KeystoneWarriors/ (last
visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
108. See Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe
– And for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (“The enforcement of legal rights consumes
real resources, including . . . indirect costs to the extent that rights are enforceable against socially
productive activities, or impose socially burdensome duties, or protect socially harmful activities.”). 
109. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 650-52. 
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legal rights comes in the form of increased costs to individual 
organizations and to society as a whole.110 When a large charitable 
organization decides to enforce an unreasonable interpretation of its 
trademark rights in an intimidating fashion against a smaller charitable 
organization, both sides of the dispute incur costs.111 There are 
straightforward legal costs involved, which include the payment of 
attorney fees and court costs (if the dispute proceeds to litigation), in 
addition to hidden non-legal costs. These non-legal costs include 
emotional strain and the time and energy required to deal with legal 
disputes.112 
Both types of costs asymmetrically burden smaller organizations. 
With regard to legal costs, the larger organization has the ability to 
control its level of costs ex ante.113 For example, the larger organization 
may decide ahead of time that a particular dispute is not worth spending 
a lot of money on and therefore may cap the extent of its enforcement 
action with respect to that dispute. With this enforcement budget in 
mind, the larger organization may then send out a cease-and-desist letter 
to the target and, regardless of whether the larger organization is 
successful in achieving compliance with its demands, drop the dispute 
when the budget has been spent.114 The smaller organization, not having 
110. See generally Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 371 (1986) (discussing the externalities to society from private litigation). 
111. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34-
36 (2013) [hereinafter AIPLA 2013 REPORT] (reporting that in 2013, costs associated with 
intellectual property litigation ranged from $300,000 to $6,000,000, depending on the type of case 
and value). 
112. See Marks, supra note 10 (quoting one small charity organization’s founder who was
considering a name change because of a legal dispute with the Lance Armstrong Foundation, “I just 
can’t stand the stress and anxiety and the wasted effort.”).  
113. As the instigator of the enforcement action, the larger organization has the ability to
execute its enforcement strategy within the budgetary limits it has placed. In addition, it is likely 
that the instigator of an enforcement action is a large organization. See Grinvald, Policing, supra 
note 19, at 418 (“Although entities of all sizes enforce their legal rights, it appears that the larger the 
company, the more likely it is to initiate court action or arbitration.”). 
114. For example, there are a number of instances where larger organizations may send out
cease-and-desist letters, the targets disagree with the demands in the letter, and larger organizations 
have taken no further action. An example of this is the cease-and-desist letter that Louis Vuitton 
sent to the University of Pennsylvania Law School over the law school group’s use of a logo that 
was similar to one of Louis Vuitton’s trademarks. See Letter from Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil 
Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier, to Michael A. Fitts, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School (Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/lv_letter.pdf. The Law 
School responded, declining to comply with Louis Vuitton’s demands. See Letter from Robert F. 
Firestone, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Michael Pantalony, Dir. 
of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier (Mar. 2, 2012), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/penn_ogc_letter.pdf. No further action was taken 
after the law school responded. See Charles Colman, Intellectual Property Magazine’s May 2012 
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the ability to information-gather, needs to take the cease-and-desist letter 
seriously and should likely retain legal counsel.115 Whether or not the 
targeted organization can retain legal counsel is another matter.116 
Should the targeted organization obtain legal counsel, the smaller 
organization will likely need to spend a greater percentage of its annual 
budget on its legal defense. For example, when the Wounded Warriors 
Project attacked Keystone Wounded Warriors, Keystone Wounded 
Warriors spent $72,000 in its legal defense, both at the USPTO and in 
federal court.117 This represented approximately eighteen percent of their 
annual revenues (approximately $200,000), as compared with the annual 
revenues of WWP (approximately $484 million in 2015).118 An 
interesting fact pointed out by the news media covering this story was 
the comparison between the Keystone Warriors’ annual revenue and the 
annual salary of WWP’s CEO, which in 2014 was approximately 
$470,000.119 Unfortunately, even after spending a significant amount of 
money on a legal defense, the smaller organization will typically likely 
decide to settle with the larger organization.120 This is what Keystone 
Wounded Warriors eventually did, renaming themselves Keystone 
Warriors.121 
The non-legal costs involved also asymmetrically burden smaller 
organizations. Legal disputes can be emotionally charged for smaller 
charitable organizations, whose founders are typically personally 
invested in the organization’s mission.122 In addition, legal disputes can 
article on the Louis Vuitton-Penn Law School dispute, LAW OF FASHION (May 2, 2012), 
http://lawoffashion.com/blog/story/05/02/2012/129.  
115. See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 426 (“conducting effective information-
gathering to obtain . . . information consumes resources . . . of which a low-resourced entity likely 
has little.”). 
116. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 656-7 (discussing the various impediments to
finding legal counsel for small businesses). 
117. Tim Mak, ‘Wounded Warrior’ Charity Unleashes Hell – On Other Veteran Groups, THE 
DAILY BEAST (May 4, 2015, 10:00AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2015/05/04/wounded-warrior-charity-unleashes-hell-on-other-veteran-groups.html. 
118. See McCambridge, supra note 82. 
119. See id. 
120. See Mak, supra note 118. 
121. See Keystone Warriors, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/KeystoneWarriors/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2016). Interestingly, Keystone Warriors was able to keep their logo of the 
silhouetted soldiers even though the CEO of WWP had stated, “Our logo is pretty sacred to us. It 
represents everything we believe in as an organization.” See CNN Wire, Keystone Wounded 
Warriors sued for ‘Unfair Competition’ by Wounded Warrior Project, WPMT FOX43 (May 12, 
2015, 10:51PM), http://fox43.com/2015/05/12/keystone-wounded-warriors-sued-for-unfair-
competition-by-wounded-warrior-project/. 
122. ALAN C. FOX, PEOPLE TOOLS FOR BUSINESS (2016) (“all litigation is emotionally
draining”). 
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take a significant amount of time, even if the dispute is never officially 
litigated.123 For example, in opposing the “Mush for a Cure” trademark 
application at the USPTO, the Komen Foundation filed two separate 
extensions of time to oppose the application, until finally withdrawing 
the opposition six months later.124 During this time, the “Mush for a 
Cure” founders had to live with the uncertainty of this legal dispute 
while attempting to continue to plan for their annual event.125 Larger 
organizations typically have general counsel and possibly other legal 
staff members who assist with trademark enforcement matters.126 
Having professionals handle legal disputes lessens the non-legal costs 
involved, and although the disputes are still time-consuming, it is an 
anticipated non-legal cost. By contrast, many smaller charitable 
organizations are volunteer-based, meaning that any legal help they 
receive would likely be found outside of the organization, either through 
finding pro bono or low-cost legal help.127 For organizations like “Mush 
for a Cure,” the founder typically bears the brunt of the non-legal and 
legal costs.128 
Finally, there are increased costs to society stemming from 
trademark bullying. Where abusive enforcement of legal rights reaches 
the judicial system, increased costs come in the form of greater 
expenditures on legal fees, as well as larger court dockets.129 Even where 
123. For a litigated civil case, the time to resolution may be one to two years. See Grinvald, 
Policing, supra note 19, at 428 (citing to an empirical study of federal courts). 
124. See Interview by WTIP’s Jay Andersen with “Mush For A Cure” organizers Mary Black
and Sue Prom (Jan. 17, 2011, 1:22PM), http://www.wtip.org/content/mush-cure-may-face-bumpy-
legal-trail-future. 
125. See id.
126. See Cathleen Flahardy, Melissa Maleske, Mary Swanton & Larua Williamson, Five 
General Counsel Who Thrive in the Non-Profit World, INSIDECOUNSEL (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2010/07/01/five-general-counsel-who-thrive-in-the-non-profit 
(interviewing the general counsels of Habitat for Humanity and American Red Cross, among 
others). 
127. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 657 n.194 (citing various methods to find free
or low-cost legal help). 
128. See interview, supra note 125 (Responding to the question of whether the legal battle
with the Komen Foundation has cost her organization any money, the co-founder Sue Prom 
answered, “It hasn’t cost us any yet. And we want to make sure, too, like, all or pledges that the 
mushers receive got the National Breast Cancer Foundation. The money that we get from sponsors 
or other donations are used to pay for the expenses. And if we decide, or if this costs any money, it’s 
not going to come from that. It will come out of my pocket, just because we’re all fighting against 
the same thing. We’re fighting against breast cancer, not against each other or corporations. So, it 
seems senseless to spend the money on it.”).  
129. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive 
to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 575 (1997) (“The legal system is a very costly 
institution, absorbing substantial resources whether measured by the magnitude of legal 
expenditures, the number of lawyers, or the sheer volume of litigation.”). 
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such abusive behavior stays outside of the courtroom, society faces costs 
associated with private-error costs and subsidizing the bullying with its 
donated funds. Private-error costs are those instances of trademark 
enforcement where the alleged infringer has a perfectly legal right to 
utilize the trademark it is using. However, instead of putting up a fight, 
the targeted party settles the dispute in order to not expend the financial 
resources outlined above. This in effect amounts to an error with ripple 
effects, as trademark bullies often cite prior cases of quick compliance 
by other targeted parties as a way to intimidate and gain future 
compliance.130 
Additionally, society faces costs due to what amounts to a 
subsidization of trademark bullying with its donated funds. Some large 
charitable organizations have been spending a not-inconsequential 
percentage of their charitable donations on legal fees. For example, in 
the midst of the Komen Foundation trademark bullying, it was revealed 
that the organization had spent over one million dollars on legal fees in 
one year alone.131 Even though donors can restrict their funds to specific 
purposes that the organization would be legally-bound to follow when 
making their donations, it is unlikely that donors would think to restrict 
their funds to non-legal matters. Therefore, it is likely that society as a 
whole bears the burden of trademark bullying. 
2. Reduction of Competition
At first blush, a reduction of the number of competing charitable
organizations may not seem like such a bad thing. After all, I have 
pointed out earlier in this Article that there are almost one million 
charitable organizations competing for a fairly fixed pot of public 
donations.132 One’s first instinct may be to think that a reduction in the 
number of charities competing for donations may be beneficial because 
larger, more established charities are better depositories for such 
donations. However, this argument overlooks the essential role that 
smaller charitable organizations play in providing complementary 
services to larger organizations, as well as providing services at the local 
level.133 
130. Alexander Zaitchik, The Village Bully One Voice Under God?, N.Y. PRESS (Apr. 29,
2003), http://www.nypress.com/print-article-7433-print.html (quoting from the Village Voice cease-
and-desist letter where the newspaper cited to past successes in obtaining compliance to its 
trademark enforcement demands). 
131. See Bassett, supra note 10. 
132. See McKeever, supra note 5, at 2. 
133. Some organizations are extremely local. For example, after one Mississippi veteran had
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While there may be multiple charities competing in the same space, 
oftentimes each charity focuses on a slightly different area and provides 
complementary services to the public. For example, Women for 
Wounded Warriors is focused on providing economic support to the 
families of wounded veterans through mentorship and advocacy for 
those seeking employment or a change in career paths.134 By contrast, 
the larger organization in the veterans’ charitable organizations world, 
Wounded Warriors Project, provides a wide range of support: physical, 
emotional, economic, and networking services.135 It is clear from the 
mission statements of the two organizations that, although they are both 
concerned with assisting veterans, each does so in a slightly different but 
complementary way.136 If smaller organizations such as Women for 
Wounded Warriors were bullied out of existence, these types of 
complementary or local services would likely cease to exist.137 
In addition, smaller charitable organizations play a crucial role in 
giving voice to less “sexy” causes or less visible societal concerns.138 
This is due to the fact that larger charitable organizations typically have 
a mission as to one particular area of concern, like children’s diabetes, 
heart disease, breast cancer, or wounded veterans’ services. In having 
one area of focus, other issues may not get the same level of attention by 
the organization, or even by society.139 For example, the Komen 
four hip surgeries, volunteers with Wounded Warriors of Mississippi helped him build a ramp to his 
house. See Lucy Dieckhaus, Mississippi Veterans Speak Out About the Wounded Warrior Project’s 
Lavish Spending, WJTV12 (Mar. 11, 2016, 6:16pm), http://wjtv.com/2016/03/11/mississippi-
veterans-speak-out-about-the-wounded-warrior-projects-lavish-spending/.  
134. About, WOMEN FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS, http://womenforwoundedwarriors.org/about/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
135. Programs, WOUNDED WARRIOR PROJECT, https://www.woundedwarriorproject.
org/programs (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
136. Compare, WOMEN FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS, About, supra note 135, with WOUNDED 
WARRIOR PROJECT, Programs, supra note 136.  
137. It has been posited by other commentators that public charities hold a special distinction
in the United States because they are heavily relied upon to provide services that the government 
does not. In other countries where charitable donation giving by the public is much less, typically 
the government provides the needed services. See Boris, supra note 74, at 1 (“Nonprofit 
organizations were propelled into U.S. public consciousness during Reagan’s budget cutbacks, 
which were designed to dismantle inefficient and ineffective government social programs. 
“Charities” were promoted as the nongovernmental saviors of the poor and of children, the elderly, 
and the disabled.”). 
138. An example of this is AIDS prevention and treatment. See Boris, supra note 74, at 3. 
139. See Ashley JR Carter & Cecine N. Nguyen, A Comparison of Cancer Burden and
Research Spending Reveals Discrepancies in the Distribution of Research Funding, BMC PUB. 
HEALTH (Jul. 17, 2012), http://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12-
526 (discussing the levels of research funding for various cancer diseases, as related to the societal 
burden). 
21
Grinvald: Charitable Trademarks
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
838 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:817 
Foundation has been extremely successful in raising awareness for 
breast cancer, which is the number two cause of death for women in the 
United States.140 This increased awareness has seemingly led to an 
increased funding for breast cancer, with recent statistics showing that 
breast cancer research funding received approximately $699 million in 
federal funding in 2016.141 When comparing breast cancer to prostate or 
lung cancer, which each received $300 million and $400 million in 
federal funding, respectively, one can see that there is likely a 
correlation between the publicity a particular issue receives and its level 
of funding.142 
Therefore, smaller organizations, like the Prostate Cancer 
Foundation or the National Headache Foundation, serve an important 
role in society, continuing to draw attention to the myriad concerns that 
different members of society have.143 
II. THE ROOTS OF OVER-ENFORCEMENT
Many scholars have written on the topic of trademark law 
expansionism since the 1950s, including myself.144 In prior work, I 
140. See Elizabeth Millard, In Raising Awareness For Women’s Health, Is Pink
Overshadowing Red?, SELF (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.self.com/story/breast-cancer-awareness-
heart-disease.  
141. Categorical Spending, NIH, https://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx (last visited
Dec. 4, 2016). 
142. See Caroline May, Breast Cancer Receives Much More Research Funding, Publicity
Than Prostate Cancer Despite Similar Number of Victims, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 5, 2010, 2:51AM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2010/10/05/breast-cancer-receives-much-more-research-funding-publicity-
than-prostate-cancer-despite-similar-number-of-victims/. Even within the same organization, breast 
cancer can receive more funding and attention. See id. (discussing the funding levels within the 
American Cancer Society). 
143. See Gardiner Harris, Medical Charities Once Advised on Coping With a Disease. Now
They Try to Cure It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/
giving/medical-charities-once-advised-on-coping-with-a-disease-now-they-try-to-cure-it.html. See 
also PROSTATE CANCER FOUNDATION, https://www.pcf.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2016); NATIONAL 
HEADACHE FOUNDATION, http://www.headaches.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2016). 
144. See generally Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the
Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as Property, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, in TRADEMARK
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH at 3 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2007); Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the 
Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2007); Robert G. Bone, Hunting 
Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548-49 
(2006); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 369 (1999); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1-3 (1999); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399 (1990); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks 
and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1162 (2003); Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, 
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placed a large amount of the blame for trademark bullying in the for-
profit sector on the legal system itself. I argue in this Part that changes to 
the Lanham Act and the application of these changes by judges has led 
to an environment of trademark over-enforcement. This background 
information will provide context for the specific proposals I make in Part 
III to attempt to curb charitable trademark bullies. 
A. Federal Trademark Law Expansionism
One of the roots of the over-enforcement problem has been the
expansion of federal trademark law.145 In fact, one could argue that 
federal trademark law has been on an ever-expanding track since the 
passage of the Lanham Act in 1945. For our purposes, there have been at 
least three forms of expansion that directly relate to over-enforcement: 
(1) an elimination of the distinction between a “trademark” and a “trade
name;” (2) an expansion in what is considered to “likely confuse”
consumers; and (3) an expansion in trademark-able subject matter. I will
discuss each in turn.
1. Elimination of the “Trademark” and “Trade Name” Distinction
Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act in 1945, an important
distinction in trademark and unfair competition law was the separation 
between “technical trademarks” and “trade names.”146 To qualify as the 
former, the mark had to be fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive. Only 
and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761 (2013); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Barton Beebe, Intellectual 
Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 832 (2010); Kenneth L. Port, The 
Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 896 (2000); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest 
in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards 
Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L.
REV. 427 (2011); Michael S. Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60 (2008); Jessica M. Kiser, Brands as Copyright, 61 VILL. L. REV. 45 (2016); Deborah R. 
Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427 (2010); Sonia K. Katyal, 
Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
795 (2010); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882 (2007); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1366-90 (2008); 
William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 
(2008); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 
(2005); Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17. 
145. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 632. 
146. Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and
Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 168 (1930); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:4 (4th ed. 2010). 
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technical trademarks could be federally registered. Trade names were all 
other types of marks, including personal names and names of entities.147 
This distinction had a direct impact on charitable organizations because 
the mark they typically used to fundraise for public donations was the 
organization’s name.148 When a charitable organization wanted to 
enforce against an alleged infringer, the organization needed to bring an 
action based on unfair competition law, not trademark law.149 The reason 
this was significant was that the burden of proof in an action for unfair 
competition law was much higher, oftentimes requiring the plaintiff to 
prove intent to confuse or mislead the public.150 In addition, some courts 
required actual harm to have been suffered, and in the case of charitable 
organizations, proof that actual confusion as to the organizations be 
present.151 By contrast, a plaintiff in a trademark lawsuit had a much 
lower burden: not having to prove intent or actual confusion, just the 
likelihood that consumers would be confused.152 
Further, the remedies available under the two causes of action were 
significantly different; while a prevailing plaintiff in both types of 
actions could obtain an injunction of the defendant’s behavior, an 
injunction under an unfair competition lawsuit could be much 
narrower.153 Typically, even where a plaintiff could prove that the 
147. MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 4:5.
148. For example, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc. 
149. Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 168. 
150. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
TRADE-MARKS 161 (1925). 
151. See, e.g., Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of State of N.Y., 29 Misc. 10, 12, 60 
N.Y.S. 302, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1899), aff’d, 63 A.D. 615, 71 N.Y.S. 1134 (App. Div. 1901), aff’d sub 
nom. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of the State of N.Y., 173 N.Y. 586, 65 N.E. 1115 
(1902) (“Another important consideration telling in favor of the defendants is found in the fact that 
there is no proof that any one has ever joined either of them in mistake for the plaintiff, or has been 
otherwise deceived or seriously confused as to the identity of the three societies . . . .”).  
152. See Schechter, supra note 151, at 161.
153. Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 169. One of the reasons for this difference lies in
the historical boundaries of the subject matter of technical trademarks and trade names. Technical 
trademarks were either fictional terms, created by the entity for the purposes of selling its goods, or 
an existing term arbitrarily used. MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §4:4. Owning a technical 
trademark gave exclusive control over the use of the term with respect to the owner’s products. See 
G.W. Cole Co. v. Am. Cement & Oil Co., 130 F.703, 705 (7th Cir. 1904). This meant that a 
defendant likely did not have a reason for selling the same good as the plaintiff using the same or 
very similar trademark, and so if the similarities between the two marks was likely to cause 
confusion, there was infringement. See id. By contrast, trade names were those that were descriptive 
of the goods or a person’s name (MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §4:5), which meant that a 
defendant would likely have a non-infringing reason for using the trade name (for example, if the 
defendant’s name was the same as the plaintiff’s). Where a plaintiff could prove trademark 
infringement, the typical remedy was a complete and permanent injunction against the use of the 
trademark. See Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 161. Typically, courts would deem such 
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defendant had infringed on plaintiff’s rights in an unfair competition 
lawsuit, the judge would craft a narrow injunction to allow the defendant 
to continue to operate while not infringing.154 In trademark lawsuits, 
courts would routinely grant blanket injunctions to enjoin defendants 
from using the plaintiff’s trademark, regardless of whether it would put 
the defendant out of business.155 
Although the strict distinction between trademarks and trade names 
was fading by the 1920s and 1930s, with courts providing similar forms 
of protection to both types of marks, the passage of the Lanham Act in 
1946 officially ended the distinction.156 The Lanham Act not only ended 
the distinction between types of marks, but it also specifically allowed 
trade names to be federally registered upon a showing of “acquired 
distinctiveness.”157 This was an important boon to trade names (and 
therefore, to charitable organizations) because a federal trademark 
registration carries with it some important evidentiary benefits, such as 
validity of mark and proof of ownership.158 Furthermore, federal 
registration provides the registered trademark with national rights, 
regardless of whether the trademark has actually been used in a 
particular area.159 This has a direct impact on charitable organizations 
because, while many start out as local volunteer groups, some of the 
organizations may grow into a bigger entity with a larger geographical 
reach.160 While an organization could still enforce its trademark rights in 
its name without a federal registration, the scope of protection would be 
limited to the geographical area of actual use and the burden of proof 
infringement has “fraudulent,” but without looking to the defendant’s intent as technical trademark 
infringement was a “no fault” tort. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §30:1. But the remedy for a 
case of proven trade name infringement was more nuanced, because there were real reasons for 
allowing a defendant to continue to use the trade name. In these cases, courts crafted injunctions 
that allowed the defendant to continue to operate its business without unfairly competing with the 
plaintiff.  
154. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
155. See Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 169. 
156. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006), with Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 
5(b), 33 Stat. 724, 725–26. 
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). The 1905 Act allowed trade names to be registered only if
they had been in constant use from 1895 or earlier. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 
5(b), 33 Stat. 724, 725–26. 
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006). 
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2006). 
160. For example, the American Diabetes Association was founded in 1940 as a professional
organization of doctors, and in 2015, the organization was a major national organization with over 
750 staff members. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 
http://main.diabetes.org/dorg/PDFs/Financial/2015-american-diabetes-association-annual-
report.pdf. 
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would be higher.161 Therefore, the ability to register one’s charitable 
trademark is an important benefit, something that the American Diabetes 
Association learned after going through trademark litigation.162 
While I am not advocating that trade names should not be federally 
registered or recognized as trademarks, I do believe that the elimination 
of the distinction between the two has given charitable organizations the 
ability to be more aggressive in enforcing its marks. Combined with the 
expansion of actionable confusion and trademark-able subject matter, 
the groundwork has been laid for charitable trademark bullies. 
2. Actionable Confusion
The second form of expansion in federal trademark law has been
with respect to the confusion standard. The traditional standard for 
trademark infringement has been whether there is a “likelihood of 
confusion” among consumers between the plaintiff’s mark and the 
defendant’s.163 The pertinent question is, what exactly do consumers 
need to be confused about? Traditional trademark law (as well as the 
original Lanham Act) had required that this likely confusion be related 
to the source of the plaintiff’s products.164 In this sense, in order for 
there to be trademark infringement, a plaintiff would need to prove that 
their consumers would likely think that they were purchasing plaintiff’s 
products when in reality they were purchasing defendant’s products 
instead.165 However, amendments to the Lanham Act in 1962 eliminated 
161. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) (“But this is not to
say that the proprietor of a trademark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can 
monopolize markets that his trade has never reached, and where the mark signifies not his goods, 
but those of another.”); Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Diabetes Ass’n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D. 
Pa. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Diabetes Ass’n, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 
1982) (“The designation American Diabetes Association is not a formally registered mark, nor is it 
inherently distinctive. Therefore, plaintiffs are required to prove that the mark can be protected and 
that it has achieved a secondary meaning.”). 
162. While the American Diabetes Association won its case against the National Diabetes
Association, it apparently decided that it was more prudent to register their trademark. The 
organization filed its lawsuit against the National Diabetes Association and the day before the court 
hearing on its preliminary injunction, the American Diabetes Association filed its application to 
register its mark with the USPTO.  
163. See, e.g., Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (16 Pick.) 214, 216 (Mass. 1837). 
164. See, e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917)
(holding that the defendant’s use of the mark “AUNT JEMIMA” for pancake syrup would likely 
confuse consumers that they were purchasing a product made by the makers of the pancake batter). 
165. See id. (“Syrup and flour are both food products, and food products commonly used
together. Obviously the public, or a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a syrup, would 
conclude that it was made by the complainant.”). 
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this restriction.166 Thereafter, courts routinely began to apply the 
likelihood of confusion standard to all types of confusion, including 
association, sponsorship, or affiliation.167 These types of confusion are 
less burdensome to prove because, as Professors Mark Lemley and Mark 
McKenna correctly note, “‘sponsorship’ or ‘affiliation’ could refer to 
virtually any relationship between the parties . . . .”168 
This expansion of the forms of actionable confusion lays the 
groundwork for charitable trademark bullying because it allows 
charitable organizations to argue that they need to protect their 
trademark against any uses that may hint of a connection with them. For 
example, the Komen Foundation has used the fact that confusion can be 
about association to justify their enforcement strategy. As the prior 
general counsel of the Komen Foundation, referring to their “For the 
Cure” trademark, stated “‘If you look at our affiliates’ websites, it can be 
anything from ‘baseball for the Cure,’ ‘lawyers for the cure,’ ‘volley for 
the Cure,’ ‘golf for the cure’—you name it, we’ve got all sorts of events 
associated with it.”169 Therefore, this association warranted contacting 
any entity that used “for the Cure” in the title of their organization or 
event and “work[ing] with them to find a suitable arrangement.”170 
3. Ever-Expanding Trademark-able Subject Matter
While the U.S. has always taken an expansive view as to what can
constitute a trademark,171 prior to the 1990s, there were still some 
limitations on what could be trademarked.172 In particular, color was 
initially held to not be subject to trademark protection.173 However, 
166. The amendments in 1962 deleted the requirement that confusion be of “purchasers as to
the source of origin of such goods or services.” MCCARTHY, supra note 147, § 5:6; see also Act of 
Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 2, 76 Stat. 769, 769. Although, as pointed out by Professors 
Lemley and McKenna, courts were already expanding the types of confusion before the 1962 
Lanham Act amendments. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 23, at 425-26. 
167. See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 501 n. 6 (5th Cir.
1979) (“Under the Lanham Act, as amended, however, Congress adopted an open-ended concept of 
confusion. Any kind of confusion will now support an action for trademark infringement.”). 
168. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 23, at 427. 
169. Rosenthal, supra note 12 (quoting Mr. Blum, the then-general counsel of the Komen
Foundation). 
170. Id. 
171. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (describing the trademark-able subject
matter as any mark that “‘consist[s] of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device’”). 
172. MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 7:41. 
173. See, e.g., A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166,
171 (1906) (“[A] trade-mark which may be infringed by a streak of any color, however applied, is 
manifestly too broad.”); James Heddon’s Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9 
(6th Cir. 1942) (“Color, except in connection with some definite, arbitrary symbol or in association 
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unlike the prior forms of expansion, amendments to the Lanham Act 
were not the primary cause of the expansion of trademark-able subject 
matter, but rather a U.S. Supreme Court case.174 In Qualitex v. 
Jacobson,175 the Supreme Court resolved a decades-long split among the 
federal circuit courts as to whether color could serve as a trademark.176 
Qualitex officially changed all of this by interpreting the language 
of the Lanham Act to be limitless in defining what a trademark could be: 
“Both the language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of 
trademark law would seem to include color within the universe of things 
that can qualify as a trademark. The language of the Lanham Act 
describes that universe in the broadest of terms.”177 The only limitation 
on what could serve as a trademark was the level of distinctiveness 
needed to prove that the “word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” is acting like a trademark from the perspective of 
the consuming public.178 For color and other types of “non-traditional” 
marks, the trademark must be shown to have “secondary meaning,” or a 
level of recognition by consumers that the color is serving as a 
trademark and not just decoration.179 For example, in Qualitex, the 
dispute was over the use of a green-gold color for dry cleaning pads. The 
plaintiff, Qualitex, argued that it used the color as a trademark and had 
been doing so for over forty years. It further argued that customers had 
come to associate this particular color with Qualitex’s dry cleaning 
pads.180 
Expansion of trademark-able subject matter alone is not necessarily 
cause for concern. There are a number of good reasons to allow 
protection for non-traditional marks such as color, including that for 
non-native English speakers, color and other types of non-traditional 
marks assist them in finding the products for which they are searching. 
In the Qualitex case, for example, the dry-cleaning business was the 
target industry for Qualitex’s green-gold pads. In the 1990s, the dry-
cleaning businesses in many states (including in Qualitex’s home city of 
with some characteristics which serve to distinguish the article as made or sold by a particular 
person is not subject to trademark monopoly.”). 
174. See Qualitex v. Jacobson, 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
175. Id.
176. Id. at 161-62 (“The Courts of Appeals have differed as to whether or not the law
recognizes the use of color alone as a trademark.”).  
177. Id. at 162. 
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (definition of a trademark and definition of trademark use: “to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or 
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown”). 
179. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
180. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
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Chicago) were run by Korean immigrants, a population for which 
English was not their first language.181 The ability to utilize color as a 
way to know which dry cleaning pads to order is helpful, and the only 
way to ensure that the dry cleaner is ordering the particular brand of 
pads is to protect the color of the source identifier. 
However, the expansion of trademark-able subject matter did not 
occur inside a vacuum, and when combined with the other two forms of 
expansion described in this Part, it has produced an environment that is 
ripe for charitable trademark bullying. This appears to be the case 
particularly where nonverbal marks are used, like color or images. For 
example, in demanding that smaller charitable organizations stop using 
“for the cure,” the Komen Foundation had also requested them to stop 
using the color pink, so as to avoid an appearance of association. 
However, it is likely that pink has become generic as a mark for a breast 
cancer organization; as in the United States, color has been used to 
identify awareness of certain types of causes, most particularly diseases, 
like breast cancer (pink), cancer (yellow or purple), AIDS/HIV (red), 
depression (green), and autism (multicolored).182 But with the backdrop 
of the three forms of expansion of trademark law, the Komen 
Foundation has the ability to claim in a cease-and-desist letter that the 
use of pink causes confusion by association. Combined with the judicial 
application of expanded trademark law, the environment is ripe for 
trademark bullying. As one lawyer sums it up, “The days are probably 
over when nonprofits just said, ‘We’ll just get along with anybody 
who’s a nonprofit because we’re all trying to do good here.’”183 
B. Shifting Court Sentiment
Although the developments in the expansion of trademark law have
been percolating in the legal system for the last seventy years, it appears 
that charitable trademark bullying (along with trademark bullying in the 
for-profit sector) only started to gain momentum in the late 2000s.184 
One of the non-legal reasons for this may be the economic depression 
suffered in the United States beginning in 2008, which greatly impacted 
181. See Murray Dubin, Koreans a Force in Dry Cleaning, PHILLY.COM (Aug. 5, 1990) (on
file with author). 
182. See Ian Langtree, Awareness Bracelets: Colors, Causes & Meanings, Disabled World, 
DISABLED-WORLD.COM (May 25, 2010), https://www.disabled-world.com/disability/awareness/
awareness-bracelets.php.  
183. See Marks, supra note 10 (quoting a trademark attorney).
184. See, e.g., supra notes 10 & 12. 
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charitable donations.185 This in turn could be seen as a reason for 
charitable organizations to turn to branding and trademarks to help them 
become more competitive in order to increase public donations.186 
However, one legal reason for the increase in charitable trademark 
bullying since the late 2000s may be a shift in judicial sentiment. I argue 
in this part that there has been a shift in the way judges apply trademark 
doctrines to charitable organizations. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, judges appeared to be more sympathetic to smaller 
organizations, with a view that all organizations are attempting to do 
good for society.187 By the late 1990s and 2000s, judges appeared to 
have become more sympathetic to larger charitable organizations, but at 
the same time, expected that these organizations would enforce their 
trademarks just like for-profit corporations.188 
1. The Early Days—All Charities Do Good
As mentioned earlier, charitable organizations are not entirely
newcomers to trademark disputes. There are a number of litigated 
disputes from the late 1800s and early 1900s,189 and there are likely a 
large number of non-litigated disputes of which there are no surviving 
records. Many litigated cases involve the use of similar names for 
organizations with similar missions. For example, in Southern Medical 
College v. Thompson, both organizations were dental schools using the 
same name “Southern Dental College.”190 In these types of cases, the 
courts appeared to be sympathetic to both sides of the dispute, and in 
applying theories of unfair competition, examined the case for intent to 
defraud on the defendant’s part.191 Where there was no such intent, the 
courts were sympathetic to the defendant’s use of a similar name due to 
the charitable work that they undertook. For example, in Colonial 
Dames of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New York, the court 
stated, 
185. See Phillip Swarts, Charities Still Feel Squeeze From Recession as Shrinking Donations
Fail to Meet Demand, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2014/apr/7/charities-still-feel-squeeze-from-recession-as-shr/. 
186. See supra note 6. 
187. See infra Part II.B.1. 
188. See infra Part II.B.2. 
189. See supra note 66. 
190. Southern Medical College v. Thompson, 92 Ga. 564, 18 S.E. 430 (Ga. 1893).
191. Or, as in the case of International Committee Young Women’s Christian Ass’ns v. Young 
Women’s Christian Ass’n of Chicago, 194 Ill. 194, 62 N.E. 551 (1901), where the majority decided 
the case without finding an intent to defraud, the dissent reminded the majority that such an intent 
was required by precedent. Id. at 554. 
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At the outset it should be noted that this case is unique, in that none of 
the parties is engaged in any business, in the sense of seeking financial 
gain. On the contrary, all are equally seeking to accomplish patriotic 
and unselfish ends. It is therefore obvious that the rules governing the 
right to trade-marks and trade-names, evolved, as those rules have 
been, from selfish attempts on the part of one person to appropriate for 
his financial benefit what rightfully belongs to another, and decisions 
of courts in thwarting such attempts, do not apply to such a case as 
this, or, at any rate, ought not to be applied with the same strictness.192 
Similar cases are found until the late 1960s, where some courts still 
appeared hesitant to apply trademark rules strictly in charitable 
organization disputes and continued to require proof of deception (actual 
intent or unintentional) on the part of defendants. For example, in the 
case of Board of Provincial Elders of Southern Province of Moravian 
Church v. Jones,193 the court denied a request for a preliminary 
injunction against the defendants and required some type of deceit to be 
shown. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated, “It may not be amiss 
in such a situation to bear in mind the advice of a great lawyer of long 
ago to an established religious body, concerned lest it be injured by the 
activities of a small group of former associates: ‘Refrain from these men, 
and let them alone False’”194 
In addition, in applying trademark defenses such as abandonment or 
laches to infringement disputes, courts appeared to err on the side of 
preserving a charitable organization’s trademark. For example, in 
Missouri Federation of the Blind v. National Federation of the Blind of 
Missouri, Inc.,195 the dispute was over the use of the term “Federation of 
the Blind.” Missouri Federation of the Blind, although technically the 
plaintiff in the case, was in fact the junior organization and faced a 
counterclaim of infringement by the National Federation of the Blind. 
The plaintiff asserted a defense of laches, abandonment, or 
acquiescence, and the court analyzed the legal consequences of each of 
the defenses.196 Although there appeared to be grounds to find 
192. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of State of N.Y., 29 Misc. 10, 11, 60 N.Y.S.
302, 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899), aff’d, 63 A.D. 615, 71 N.Y.S. 1134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901), aff’d sub 
nom. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of the State of N.Y., 173 N.Y. 586, 65 N.E. 1115 
(N.Y. 1902). 
193. Board of Provincial Elders, 273 N.C. 174, 159 S.E.2d 545 (1968). 
194. Id. at 552. 
195. Mo. Fed’n of the Blind v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Mo., Inc., 505 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1973). 
196. Id.
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abandonment,197 the court found that the doctrine of laches was better 
applied. In determining that the National Federation of the Blind’s suit 
against the Missouri Federation of the Blind was barred by laches, the 
court simply did not allow the defendant-intervenor to enjoin the 
plaintiff from using its name.198 What this ruling meant was that the 
National Federation of the Blind retained its trademark, but it simply 
could not enforce it against the Missouri Federation of the Blind. If the 
court had found that the National Federation of the Blind had abandoned 
its mark, then this would have prevented the National Federation of the 
Blind from enforcing its mark in the future against any other 
unauthorized users.199 
2. More Recent Cases—Well-Established Charities Need Greater
Protection
This more tolerant approach to charitable organizations seemed to 
end around the late 1980s, particularly with respect to cases where larger 
charitable organizations sue smaller organizations for trademark 
infringement. Judges acknowledge this approach in, for example, 
Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc., Inc., where the 
judge states in a footnote, “Interestingly, although there seems to be no 
legal theory articulated to support the proposition, it appears that public 
service or benefit entities are accorded greater protection by the courts in 
cases like this one than are for profit business organizations.”200 This 
same sentiment appears in at least two other different cases involving 
nonprofit organizations.201 In Cancer Research Institute, the plaintiff 
was a large, well-established organization with $3.5 million in annual 
revenue and the defendant was a small, more recently established 
organization with less than $300,000 in annual revenue.202 In the court’s 
opinion, the judge’s regard for the plaintiff is apparent, as the judge 
refers to the director of the Cancer Research Institute as “impressive” 
and refers to the defendants as “amateurs, who seem to the Court to be 
way over their respective heads.”203 
197. At least on the part by the local society.
198. Mo. Fed’n of the Blind, 505 S.W.2d at 10. 
199. See 15 U.S.C. §1064 (2006) (registered marks deemed to have been abandoned may be
cancelled). 
200. Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc’y, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1051, 1056
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
201. Alzheimer’s and Credit Counseling 
202. Cancer Research Inst., Inc., 694 F. Supp. at 1056. 
203. Id. 
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Judge Sweet in Alzheimer’s Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer’s 
Disease & Related Disorders Ass’n, Inc. articulated a reason for the 
greater protection given to charitable organizations: “A compelling 
reason for the enhanced judicial protection of a charity’s trademarks is 
the public interest in ensuring their contributions to charitable 
organizations are received by the correct charity.”204 This sentiment 
appears to be slightly different from the one that appeared a century 
earlier in Colonial Dames, discussed above, and which is also held by 
judges in cases as late as 1953.205 In Colonial Dames, Judge Bookstaver 
stated, 
Reasons which may be all-sufficient to induce a court to restrain a de-
fendant from making money that a plaintiff is entitled to make may be 
wholly inadequate to warrant such interference where it is a question 
of doing good deeds. In such a case the public welfare will not be con-
served by too great astuteness in recognizing the exclusive rights that 
sometimes are accorded to priority. The work as well as the workers 
should be considered, and chiefly considered; because it is more im-
portant that philanthropic work should be done than that any particular 
person should have the gratification of doing it.206 
The consumer’s interest in making sure their contributions are not 
waylaid by other organizations, even though other organizations are 
fighting the same fight, appears to take precedent over the larger goal of 
bettering society. This is an interesting shift, and one that does not 
necessarily reflect the view of the consuming public. For example, upon 
learning that the Komen Foundation had spent almost one million 
dollars in one year to pursue its trademark enforcement strategy for its 
“for the Cure” mark, comedian Stephen Colbert satirically stated, “If 
they don’t own the phrase “for the Cure,” then people might donate 
money thinking it’s going to an organization dedicated to curing cancer, 
when instead it’s wasted on organizations dedicated to curing cancer.”207 
204. Alzheimer’s Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer’s Disease & Related Disorders Ass’n, 796
F. Supp. 2d 458, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)] 
205. See N. Country Cmty. Hosp. v. N. Shore Hosp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1953). Generally speaking, the courts will not intervene to restrain a charitable corporation unless 
the names are strikingly similar.  
206. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of State of N.Y., 29 Misc. 10, 13, 60 N.Y.S.
302, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1899), aff’d, 63 A.D. 615, 71 N.Y.S. 1134 (App. Div. 1901), aff’d sub nom. 
Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of the State of N.Y., 173 N.Y. 586, 65 N.E. 1115 
(1902).  
207. See, for example, Stephen Colbert’s satirical “Tip of the Hat, Wag of the Finger” to the
Komen Foundation for bullying smaller organizations that use “for the Cure”. The Colbert Report: 
Episode 7001 (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.cc.com/video-
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In addition to providing greater protection to charitable 
organizations against smaller and newer charitable entities, courts appear 
to be holding charitable organizations to fairly high standards of 
trademark enforcement and quality assurance. An example of this is the 
2010 FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network case. 
FreecycleSunnyvale (Sunnyvale) brought a declaratory judgment action 
against The Freecycle Network asking the court to find that Sunnyvale 
was not infringing on Freecycle Network’s mark “Freecycle” because 
the mark had been abandoned through the Freecycle Network’s lack of 
quality control.208 The Freecycle Network is a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to “freecycling,” which is recycling of an unwanted item by 
donating it to another person instead of disposing of it in the trash.209 In 
2003, the Freecycle Network oversaw local freecycling groups that were 
established through Yahoo! Groups and in 2005 sent a cease-and-desist 
letter to Sunnyvale requesting that it stop using the mark “Freecycle”.210 
When Sunnyvale refused to comply with its request, Freecylce Network 
had Yahoo! Groups shut down Sunnyvale’s group.211 
As a general matter, where abandonment through lack of quality 
control, also known as naked licensing, has been alleged, a majority of 
courts have had a “friendly attitude.”212 In such cases, courts require that 
the allegations of naked licensing be held to a “stringent standard” 
before being proven true.213 This is because a court will hold a 
trademark to be abandoned if it finds naked licensing, which equates to a 
total loss of one’s trademark.214 In addition, where a nonprofit 
organization is faced with allegations of naked licensing, courts have 
been more apt to find an “implied license” rather than a naked license.215 
For example, where a nonprofit university was alleged to not have any 
rights in its “Bucky Badger” trademark, the court found that there had 
clips/7b084t/the-colbert-report-tip-wag—-susan-g—komen-foundation—-spider-man-musical. 
208. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010). 
209. Id. at 513. 
210. Id. at 513-14. 
211. Id. at 514. 
212. Irene Calboli, The Sunset of ‘Quality Control’ in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM.
U.L. REV. 341, 366 (2007). 
213. Id. at 367 (“[C]ourts consistently affirmed that claimants of naked licenses ‘face[d] a
stringent standard [of proof].”) 
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 1141c (Section 45 of the Lanham Act): Definition of abandonment. See 
also Calboli, supra note 213, at 367. 
215. An implied license is a judicially-constructed contract that is intended to “track the intent
of the contracting parties for purposes of supplementing their agreement.” Orit Fischman Afori, 
Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 275, 276 (2009).  
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been an implied license between the university and sellers of the badger 
items.216 In Freecycle, however, the court seems to break with this more 
lenient take on naked licensing and brings the gavel down on Freecycle 
Network, finding that Freecycle Network had abandoned its mark 
through naked licensing.217 
The consequence of Freecycle and the other cases that provide for 
greater protection of trademarks to charitable organizations appears to 
have been the creation of an environment where larger charitable 
organizations believe they need to enforce their marks in a fashion 
similar to that of a for-profit organization. Within this legal environment, 
having built up a well-known and trusted charitable brand, these entities 
(and their lawyers) are nervous that they may lose their mark if they do 
not institute aggressive trademark enforcement strategies. We can see 
this through the actions of some of the more well-known bullies such as 
the Komen Foundation (its “for a Cure” enforcement), the Livestrong 
Foundation (its “strong” enforcement), and WWP (its “Wounded 
Warriors” and silhouette imagery enforcement).218 In addition, 
statements made by some of the entities accused of trademark bullying 
give insight into the angst these entities are likely facing: “trademarks 
serve as a shortcut (positive or negative) for the public to judge the 
quality of charitable services, the caliber of programs, and the credibility 
of information provided. Policing your trademarks is not an option. It’s 
an affirmative, legal duty.”219 I propose a number of suggestions below 
216. Univ. Book Store v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385 (TTAB 1994). Although this is a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board case and not a federal 
district or circuit court case, this case has been cited with approval by other cases. See Bunn-O-
Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 2000); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 
F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Kan. 2008); Bishops Bay Founders Grp., Inc. v. Bishops Bay Apartments,
LLC, 301 F. Supp. 2d 901 (W.D. Wis. 2003). 
217. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 520 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010). 
However, it could be argued that the Ninth Circuit simply took the less popular route of strictly 
requiring actual control of the Freecycle trademark. See Calboli, supra note 213, at 367 (“[O]nly 
occasionally has the lack of adequate control brought the judiciary to declare licenses void.”). 
218. For a list of oppositions involving the Susan G. Komen Foundation, see
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?qt=adv&procstatus=All&pn=susan+g.+komen. For a list of 
oppositions involving the Livestrong Foundation, see http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/
v?qt=adv&procstatus=All&pn=livestrong. For a list of oppositions involving the WWP, see 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?qt=adv&procstatus=All&pn=WOUNDED+WARRIOR+PROJE
CT. 
219. Abby V. Reiner, Nonprofit Brand Tinted with – not Tainted by – Legal, DUETSBLOG (Jul.
22, 2014), http://www.duetsblog.com/2014/07/articles/trademarks/nonprofit-brand-tinted-with-not-
tainted-by-legal (Ms. Reiner is the Brand Director for WWP, Inc.). Earlier in the piece, Ms. Reiner 
does acknowledge that “chasing down every unauthorized trademark use is time-consuming, 
expensive, and ultimately counterproductive. There is an inherently increased risk factor to 
nonprofits conducting the same monitoring and enforcement activities as for-profits due to the 
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that could help change the legal environment for charitable organizations 
and hopefully dampen the potential angst of having to be over-vigilant 
with one’s marks. 
III. SUGGESTIONS TO TAME THE BULLIES
I am not the first person to suggest that changes need to be made in 
order to accommodate charitable organizations.220 Other commentators 
have proposed suggestions made with an eye towards providing greater 
protection to charitable organizations through amendments to the 
Lanham Act and through expansions in doctrine, such as eliminating the 
commercial requirement before applying the initial interest doctrine.221 I 
am, however, one of the first to suggest changes that would serve to limit 
how trademark doctrine applies to charitable organizations.222 
In this Part, I look at disputes in both the judicial context (where a 
dispute has reached the litigation stage) and the nonjudicial context 
(where a dispute remains outside the sphere of the courtroom). I note 
that it is likely that only a small percentage of disputes among charitable 
organizations actually reach the litigation stage and therefore my 
suggestions in the judicial context may not be directly helpful.223  
Nevertheless, the reason changes need to be made in the judicial context 
is two-fold: first, if judges make it harder for charitable trademark 
bullies to plead trademark infringement, then an early dismissal of a 
lawsuit may occur more frequently,224 and second, tougher pleading 
nature by which nonprofits are ‘judged.’” However, Ms. Reiner does not provide any guidelines for 
what WWP, Inc. would view as an unauthorized trademark use that they would not enforce against. 
220. See Lauren Behr, Note, Trademarks for the Cure: Why Nonprofits Need Their Own Set of 
Trademark Rules, 54 B.C. L. REV. 243 (2013); Christopher T. Ward, Who’s Afraid of the Big, 
Friendly Nonprofit? Saber Rattling and the Sad State of Affairs for Small Charitable Nonprofits and 
Trademark Law, 11 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 295 (2011); Richard D. Salgado, Piracy and 
Chaos in the Marketplace of Ideas: Why Money Cannot Be Everything When Assessing Initial-
Interest Confusion and Nonprofit Trademark Holders, 61 ARK. L. REV. 241 (2008). 
221. See generally Behr, supra note 221 (amendments to Lanham Act); Salgado, supra note 
221 (eliminating commerciality as requirement in initial interest confusion arguments). 
222. See Ward, supra note 221, at 323-25 (proposing a number of changes to clarify trademark 
law with an eye towards assisting smaller charitable organizations). 
223. Only a small percentage of all intellectual property-related disputes actually reach the
litigation stage, and so by corollary, only a small percentage of all disputes among charitable 
organizations would do the same. See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual 
Property Litigation: Some Preliminary Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 761 (2004) (relating that 
only three percent of all legal disputes are brought to the courthouse). 
224. Although another method of obtaining an early dismissal of a lawsuit is through the use
of a state’s anti-SLAPP law, not all states have them enacted. See Rebecca Schoff Curtin, SLAPPing 
Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation Can Learn from the Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. 
TECH L. REV. 39, 45 (2014) (“Anti-SLAPP laws have provided states with a wealth of experience in 
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standards may have an indirect effect on deterring cases that cannot meet 
the higher standards.225 
A. Heightened Pleading Requirements
Many scholars have written about pleading standards, particularly
after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, both of which arguably served to heighten the 
pleading standards in federal civil litigation.226 “Twiqbal,” as the two 
cases are commonly referred to together,227 did this by requiring that the 
plaintiff’s complaint include facts that provide “plausibility” to the 
alleged wrongdoings, and not simply a “belief.”228 As a result, many 
scholars have bemoaned the “significant hurdles” that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions have placed in the way of bringing civil lawsuits.229 
The issue in the trademark realm, however, is that where a charitable 
trademark bully has a registered trademark, this can potentially provide 
the factual plausibility for a trademark infringement action.230 This 
the use of particular tools to deter and deal with nuisance suits, such as an expedited motion to 
dismiss with a stay of discovery.”); Marc J. Randazza, The Need for a Unified and Cohesive 
National Anti-SLAPP Law, 91 OR. L. REV. 627, 628 (2012) (arguing for a unified anti-SLAPP law 
because of the disparity between states that have strong anti-SLAPP laws, weak laws, and no laws 
at all); Eric Goldman, We Need Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation, But Sen. Kyl’s “Free Press Act of 
2012” Isn’t the Answer (Yet), FORBES (Sept. 24, 2012, 11:52 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/09/24/we-need-federal-anti-slapp-legislation-but-
sen-kyls-free-press-act-of-2012%E2%80%B3-isnt-the-answer-yet/#11c2b91ab22b.  
225. This would have an effect on those bullies operating in the “shadow of the law.” See 
generally William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 453 (2012). 
226. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009). Compare Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (2010) (“Given the dramatic changes and 
sharp debate precipitated by Twombly and Iqbal, the Federal Rules – indeed, federal civil practice in 
general – stand at a critical crossroads.”), with Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2010) (“This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that Iqbal and 
Twombly run roughshod over a half-century’s worth of accumulated wisdom on pleading 
standards.”).
227. Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. L. ED. 744, 744 (2016).
228. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434 (2008). 
229. See generally Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly - A Study on the Impact 
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008) 
(providing an empirical study of the effect of Twombly and finding that the rate of dismissal in civil 
rights cases spiked in the four months after Twombly was decided); Spencer, supra note 229 
(arguing that the holding of Twombly is against the “original liberal ethos” of the American 
litigation system). 
230. Robert T. Sherwin, #HaveWeReallyThoughtThisThrough?: Why Granting Trademark
Protection to Hashtags Is Unnecessary, Duplicative, and Downright Dangerous, 29 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 455, 491 (2016).  
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would mean that even if the lawsuit was in fact based on an 
unreasonable interpretation of the charitable organization’s trademark, a 
court may not discover this until the case proceeds further on past the 
pleading stage.231 
What this does is increase the probability that the charitable 
trademark bully would succeed in their bullying, as smaller charitable 
organizations would likely not have the resources to defend an extended 
legal battle. Therefore, I suggest that judges should require factually 
plausible allegations of either deceptive intent or source confusion (for 
example, waylaid donations due to source confusion on the part of 
donors).232 I argue that either could be required by judges because the 
Lanham Act only specifies that the standard for trademark infringement 
be a “likelihood of confusion.”233 Judges have been at the forefront of 
interpreting this provision since its enactment, and therefore, there 
should be little to bar judges from interpreting the statute to require one 
of these additional pleading requirements. 
1. Defendant’s Deceptive Intent234
As discussed in Part II, historically, when charitable organizations
litigated disputes over their names, they typically had to litigate under a 
theory of unfair competition, as their organization names were 
considered trade names and not trademarks.235 Unfair competition 
required the plaintiff prove that in adopting the plaintiff’s name (or a 
name very similar), the defendant’s intent was to deceive the public and 
pass themselves as the plaintiff.236 With the removal of the distinction 
between trade names and trademarks, the requirement to prove deception 
was also erased, with courts tending to infer deceit on the part of the 
adoption of the same name or a very similar name.237 This has meant 
231. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(1)(A). At the very least, a complaint that states “a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face” would survive a motion to dismiss and require the defendant to file an 
answer. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
570). 
232. This would be in addition to the other elements of a prima facie case of trademark
infringement. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 34:1.  
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
234. I focus in this section on the defendant’s deceptive intent, rather than on defendant’s 
general intent in adopting and using the trademark at issue. As a technical matter, trademark 
infringement (as opposed to unfair competition) cases do not consider the defendant’s good faith 
intent in whether the trademark at issue is infringing. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §23:124 
(“A mistaken, good faith belief will not excuse otherwise illegal infringement.”). 
235. See Handler & Pickett, supra note 147. 
236. See SCHECHTER supra note 151. 
237. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 23:105. 
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that plaintiffs bringing trademark infringement claims based on an 
organization’s name no longer have to plead deceptive intent on the part 
of the defendants as part of a prima facie case.238 
In so doing, this has eased the burden on plaintiffs and can perhaps 
partially explain the rise in trademark litigation undertaken by charitable 
organizations.239 While the consideration of bad-faith intent has not 
disappeared from trademark infringement cases altogether, it is generally 
considered at a later stage of the case.240 Courts will consider evidence 
of a defendant’s bad faith when analyzing whether a defendant’s use of 
its trademark is likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff’s.241 In fact, 
where the evidence is mixed on whether the defendant’s actions would 
likely cause confusion, courts have often held in favor of the plaintiff 
where there was evidence of a bad-faith intent on the defendant’s part.242 
However, since consideration of this deceptive intent is undertaken with 
an analysis of the merits of the case, this would mean that the lawsuit is 
well under way at this point.243 To reiterate my earlier point, it is 
unlikely that a smaller charitable organization could sustain a defense to 
get to this point. Bringing back a deceptive intent requirement at the 
pleading stage may serve to limit the number of cases that proceed past 
pleadings.244 
I do recognize that there are a number of difficulties with requiring 
238. See Sunward Electronics, Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, *25, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002 (2d
Cir. 2004) (holding that a wrongful intent is not a prerequisite in a Lanham Act case for trademark 
infringement under § 32 or under § 43(a)). 
239. See supra Part I.
240. It is typically considered as a factor in the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, as
well as the damages stage. Where a defendant has acted in bad-faith, the defendant’s profits may be 
awarded to the plaintiff, along with other damages. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 23:111. 
241. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing the
likelihood of confusion factors: “[t]he prior owner’s chance of success is a function of many 
variables: the strength of his make, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of 
the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the 
reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, 
and the sophistication of the buyers.”) (emphasis added). 
242. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006). 
243. See Mark Bartholomew, Trademark Morality, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 157 (2013)
(“[E]ven if they lack evidence of the defendant’s intent before filing suit, trademark holders are 
incentivized to file and commit the defendant to expensive discovery proceedings in the hopes that 
such evidence will appear.”). 
244. Other scholars, including Professors Bartholomew and McKenna and Bob Bone, have
proposed the use of some form of deceptive intent to be part of trademark infringement cases. See 
id.; Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 
67, 113 (2012); Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood Of Confusion”: Toward 
a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1350–53 (2012). 
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plausible bad-faith intent to be included as a requirement in a plaintiff’s 
complaint. As a theoretical matter, some courts have held that the 
defendant’s intent is not the primary issue at stake in a trademark 
infringement lawsuit—it is whether the consumers will be confused.245 
In addition, some commentators have argued that intent should never be 
considered in a trademark infringement lawsuit due to the need to be 
consumer-focused.246 
Requiring the defendant’s bad-faith intent to be a part of a 
plaintiff’s prima facie case may move trademark law slightly away from 
a consumer-focus, but many scholars have argued that this has already 
happened with other doctrines such as dilution.247 Therefore, as a 
practical matter, I believe there is room for a bad-faith intent pleading 
requirement in order to combat abusive trademark litigation. It would 
seem that many courts may in fact welcome this requirement. I already 
mentioned that courts are already using the existence of bad-faith intent 
as a way to decide close cases.248 Additionally, as noted by Professor 
Bob Bone, courts use the defendant’s bad-faith intent as a way to 
moralize a finding of trademark infringement.249 My proposal would 
245. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1265 n.16 (9th Cir. 1982)
(“The basic policy behind the Lanham Act is to protect customers against likelihood of 
confusion. . . . Given this policy, the determination of liability focuses on the objective fact of likely 
customer confusion and not on the subjective mental state of the infringer.”). 
246. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 23:124 (“State of mind may be important
when it comes to fashioning the scope of injunctive relief and the award of monetary relief, but 
should have little or no weight in determining liability in the first place.”); Thomas L. Casagrande, 
A Verdict for Your Thoughts? Why an accused Infringer’s Intent Has No Place in Likelihood of 
Confusion Analysis, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1447 (2011) (proposing an elimination of intent as a 
factor to be considered in determining trademark infringement). But see Bartholomew, supra note 
244, at 158 (“the goal should not be to completely excise moral concerns from trademark law but to 
bring them to the surface and subject them to further interrogation, just like any other technique of 
legal argument”). My proposal would be similar to Professor Bartholomew’s suggestion of openly 
acknowledging moral decision-making. 
247. See, e.g., Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
212, 212 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999) (“[D]ilution laws represent a fundamental shift in the nature of 
trademark protection.”). See also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1845 (2007) (citing other types of trademark law doctrine that 
scholars have criticized have gone beyond the consumer-focus). 
248. See Beebe, supra 243, at 1600. 
249. Bone, supra note 245, at 1350–53. Like Professor Bone, I advocate for courts to use a
defendant’s deceptive intent more “explicitly.” Id. at 1353 (“The moral function of intentional 
deception should be brought to the fore and explicitly factored into the construction of liability 
rules. Doing so shows why the simple test is justified: a plaintiff should be able to enjoin use of a 
mark by proving that the defendant adopted the mark with the intent to deceive consumers.”). See 
also generally Bartholomew, supra note 244 (arguing that judges use moral judgments to decide 
cases of trademark infringement).  
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simply shift such consideration of defendant’s bad-faith intent to an 
earlier stage of the litigation and allow courts to dismiss cases earlier. 
Another valid concern is that placing an additional requirement on a 
plaintiff’s pleading will cause insurmountable hurdles, which may 
discourage or limit trademark holders’ abilities to bring litigation.250 In 
turn, this may then push such discouraged plaintiffs into resolving their 
trademark infringement disputes extra-judicially, such as through cease-
and-desist letters. In response to this concern, I would argue that this has 
already happened to some extent due to the high costs (both in time and 
money) of litigation, as well as the high levels of uncertainty of 
outcome.251 Although some charitable organizations may feel 
constrained in their policing efforts, it is important to recall that there are 
a number of non-judicial avenues available to police against fraudulent 
or misrepresentative entities, including the Federal Trade Commission, 
the FBI, state Attorneys General, or even through shaming the rogue 
entity.252 
2. Source Confusion
I am not the first scholar to argue for a limitation on trademark
infringement lawsuits through the use of a more narrowly-focused 
confusion requirement. Many scholars before me have done so quite 
eloquently, and I do not have the space to do all of them justice.253 
Instead, I will focus on the formulation of an argument proposed by 
Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna.254 Professors Lemley and 
McKenna posit that confusion, other than about source or matters related 
250. This is a similar concern that has been raised in the more general debate regarding the
post-Twiqbal pleading rules. See supra note 230. 
251. See generally, Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19. 
252. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, Trump Investigations Now Multiplying, FORTUNE (Sept. 15,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/14/trump-foundation-investigation-pam-bondi/ (reporting New 
York State Attorney General’s investigation into the Trump Foundation, a public charity); Mitch 
Blacher, FBI Investigates Charity Associated with DA Seth Williams, NBC10 PHILADELPHIA (Sept. 
10, 2016), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/investigations/FBI-Investigates-Charity-Associated-
with-DA-Seth-Williams_Philadelphia-394344331.html (reporting that the FBI is investigating a 
public charity associated with the Philadelphia District Attorney); Press Release, FTC, FTC, States 
Settle Claims Against Two Entities Claiming to Be Cancer Charities; Orders Require Entities to Be 
Dissolved and Ban Leader from Working for Non-Profits, Mar. 30, 2016, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-states-settle-claims-against-two-entities-claiming-be-cancer. I 
discuss shaming below in Part III.B. 
253. See, e.g., McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 23, at 301-06; McKenna, supra note 245,
at 136.  
254. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010). 
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to quality, is “irrelevant” and should not be part of trademark law.255 
Instead, they argue that in trademark cases, including those cases where 
consumers would be confused as to who is guaranteeing the quality of 
the products at issue, courts should focus their attention on material 
confusion.256 All other types of confusion should be handled according 
to false advertising law, which requires an element of materiality.257 
I agree wholeheartedly with Professors Lemley and McKenna’s 
proposal and believe that courts should adopt it. Additionally, I would 
argue that it should be required that a plaintiff plead this type of 
confusion in its complaint or else the complaint should fail. Particularly 
for charitable organizations, the complaint would need to plausibly 
allege that the defendant’s use of its trademark likely confuses donors 
about the entity to whom they are donating. Time and again, courts have 
stated that the harm in charitable organization trademark cases is 
waylaid donations.258 This type of confusion is one about source, in that 
donors should be able to rely on the trademark of the charitable 
organization to be assured that their donation is going to the correct 
source. Other types of confusion and confusion-related doctrines 
(confusion regarding association or affiliation, and initial interest and 
post-sale confusion) are just not relevant in these situations.259 This 
requirement would serve to act as a gatekeeper, keeping litigation that is 
not about source outside of the courthouse. In addition, the hope would 
be that it would have the effect of limiting the types of trademark 
infringement enforcement actions that are undertaken outside of the 
courthouse.260 
255. Id. at 414. 
256. Id. at 415. 
257. Id. at 445-46. 
258. See, e.g., Deborah Heart and Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 
2d 481, 494 (D.N.J. 2000) (“the public also has a right to know to whom they are giving their 
money and who is administering these services. . . . The consumers of these services should 
likewise know which organization is treating them and which is not”). 
259. For more on other types of confusion, please see generally Jeremy Sheff, Veblen Brands, 
96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012) (post-sale confusion); Zachary J. King, Knock-off My Mark, Get Set, 
Go to Jail? The Improprieties of Criminalizing Post-Sale Confusion, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2220 
(2012) (post-sale confusion); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 
54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005) (initial interest confusion); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest 
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005) (initial 
interest confusion). 
260. Although hard to quantify, more enforcement cases are handled extra-judicially through
informal enforcement processes, such as cease-and-desist letters. See Gallagher, supra note 226, at 
481-82; Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 412; Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark
Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 854-57 (2012).
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B. Shaming
In earlier work, I argue that responsible shaming of trademark
bullies can be an effective non-judicial method of defending oneself 
against bullies.261 Particularly when used on social media, I argue that 
responsible shaming of trademark bullies could be a low-cost method of 
defending a small business or individual from trademark bullying.262 
Effective, responsible shaming allows for a small business or individual 
to fight back and stop the bullying, oftentimes allowing the targeted 
entity to obtain a reasonable settlement or to have the bully drop their 
enforcement efforts altogether.263 I outline four conditions that are 
needed for effective shaming: (1) the trademark bully is vulnerable to 
shaming; (2) a community with shared norms exists; (3) the trademark 
bully, its consumers, and the shamers are part of the same community; 
and (4) the shamer is credible.264 Not only are all of these conditions 
typically present in the charitable organization context, but as I will 
argue below, some of the conditions are amplified when they are applied 
in such context. 
1. Charitable Trademark Bullies are Vulnerable to Shaming
In the for-profit sector, one of the main problems with the
effectiveness of shaming is that some trademark bullies are 
unshameable.265 There are some large trademark holders that are 
comfortable with being labeled a trademark bully, and further, they may 
be seeking to attain that reputation because it enables them to more 
effectively enforce their trademarks going forward. For example, many 
unshameable trademark bullies will often cite to prior cases in their 
cease-and-desist letters to intimidate the target into capitulating without 
putting up a fight.266 One of the reasons that a large entity may be 
immune to shaming is because they have a product or service for which 
261. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17. 
262. Id. at 677. 
263. Id. at 627 (relating the story of “VERMONSTER”). 
264. Id. at 666-67. 
265. Id. at 672. 
266. See, e.g., Alexander Zaitchik, The Village Bully One Voice Under God?, N.Y. PRESS 
(Apr. 29, 2003), http://www.nypress.com/the-village-bully-one-voice-under-god/ (quoting cease-
and-desist letter: “We hope to resolve this matter amicably, and, if you respond promptly, are 
willing to work with you in an effort to minimize any disruption to your company’s business. Our 
previous experience with the Bloomington Voice, Dayton Voice and Tacoma Voice newspapers . . . 
indicates that we can accomplish this goal”). 
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they believe there is no good substitute.267 In these situations, it is likely 
that the large trademark holder believes that even if they gain a 
reputation as a trademark bully, their consumers will likely not stop 
purchasing their products.268 
In the nonprofit sector, however, it is highly unlikely that any 
charitable organization will be immune to shaming, as charitable 
services are somewhat fungible.269 Charitable organizations, particularly 
those that rely on public donations for a bulk of their funding, may be 
particularly vulnerable to shaming because they are already relying on 
the goodwill of the public to donate. A strong charitable brand is likely 
strong because they have convinced the public to trust that the public’s 
donations are mainly going towards bettering society. Any hint of 
wrongdoing and the public may donate elsewhere. In fact, recent 
behavior by charitable organizations and donors proves this point. After 
the media covered stories of the Komen Foundation’s trademark 
bullying, the Komen Foundation was shamed by a number of different 
outlets, including former supporters of the Komen Foundation and the 
comedian Stephen Colbert.270 Former donors of the Komen Foundation 
stated that they would not donate anymore.271 Right after the shaming, 
the Komen Foundation dropped almost all of its oppositions to those 
smaller entities who were using “for a Cure.”272 This suggests that 
charitable organizations can be particularly vulnerable to responsible 
shaming. 
267. See, e.g., Robert Garson, Are the Kardashians Trademark Bullies?, OBSERVER (Dec. 8,
2016), http://observer.com/2016/12/are-the-kardashians-trademark-bullies/ (author opining on 
whether the Kardashians are trademark bullies); Drew Harwell, These College Students Took on 
One of America’s Top Trademark Bullies – and Won, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/02/29/these-college-students-took-on-
one-of-americas-top-trademark-bullies-and-won/?utm_term=.85aab3dad71f (reporting on Monster 
Energy’s trademark bullying of Monsterfishkeepers.com). 
268. This could be the reason that Monster Energy continues to be a top trademark bully. See 
Harwell, supra note 268. 
269. One could argue that all charitable organizations provide a fungible service in a way, as
all organizations are attempting to better society. However, even when examining charitable 
organizations more granularly, there is overlap in a number of similar categories. See, e.g., Charity 
Ratings, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charities (click on “search for charity by 
category”). 
270. See supra note 208. 
271. See Bassett, supra note 10 (quoting the founder of “Mush for a Cure”).
272. See supra note 219 (showing that the date of the dropped oppositions was close in time to 
when shaming took place).  
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2. Communities and Shared Norms
Community and shared norms are two other conditions that are
amplified in the nonprofit arena. Many charitable organizations have 
donors who are committed to an organization’s cause due to a shared 
characteristic or background. For example, many members of the 
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF) have juvenile diabetes or 
a loved one with juvenile diabetes.273 In addition, these types of 
charitable organizations work hard at building their communities 
through their branding.274 These organizations host annual fundraisers, 
hold year-round events like 5K road races, and sell bracelets or ribbons 
to raise donations and build a community.275 When the Livestrong 
Foundation began selling their yellow rubber bracelets that signify 
support for those with cancer, it became an overnight sensation.276 
Families and friends touched by cancer would wear these bracelets, and 
wearing them while seeing others wearing them would make them feel 
connected with a community.277 
Additionally, communities of large and small charitable 
organizations often overlap, such that shaming the trademark bully 
would be seen by members of both communities. For example, the 
founders of “Mush for a Cure” would often donate to the Komen 
Foundation personally even though the proceeds from their annual 
fundraiser went to the National Cancer Society (however, after they 
were themselves targeted by the Komen Foundation, they vowed to no 
longer donate to them).278 
Further, these communities share norms of how they believe their 
charitable organizations should behave. For example, when the founder 
of Livestrong, Lance Armstrong, finally admitted that he had used 
performance-enhancing drugs in order to outperform his competitors in 
273. See JDRF, www.jdrf.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
274. The same is certainly true in the for-profit sector. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Media
Amplify Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1491, 1509-10 (2012). 
275. See generally Daniel Webber, Understanding Charity Fundraising Events, 9 INT’ J.
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING 122 (2004) (discussing different types of 
charitable fundraisers and potential motivations for holding them). 
276. TIMOTHY KACHINSKE, 90 DAYS TO SUCCESS IN FUNDRAISING 98 (2009) (“Yellow 
Livestrong bracelets worn by Lance Armstrong on the Tour de France became an overnight 
sensation and raised millions of dollars for his foundation.”). 
277. See, e.g., Jonathan Agin, I Still Wear the Yellow Bracelet, HUFF. POST THE BLOG (Nov.
15, 2012, at 4:20PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-agin/i-still-wear-the-yellow-
b_b_2130306.html. 
278. See Bassett, supra note 10 (quoting the founder of “Mush for a Cure”).
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the Tour de France, a majority of the community was devastated.279 The 
scandal caused Lance Armstrong to resign from his position as CEO of 
the Livestrong Foundation.280 Some community members stopped 
wearing the yellow bracelets but still supported Livestrong, while others 
left the community altogether and vowed to no longer support the 
organization.281 The same has happened with WWP, which has recently 
undergone a scandal about how it spends its money. The founder and 
CEO, as well as the COO, resigned. What has been interesting about the 
WWP aftermath is that other charitable organizations that also fundraise 
in order to assist wounded veterans have tried to ensure that the public 
know they are not affiliated with WWP. This appears to be due to the 
scandal and not because of WWP’s trademark bullying efforts.282 
However, it is important to responsible shaming that communities 
not only share norms of how the organization should behave, but also 
share the same legal norms.283 With trademark bullying, the legal norm 
that has been violated is the unreasonable interpretation of trademark 
rights by the bullier. Although it is likely that communities will react 
negatively to shaming when larger charitable organizations are cast in 
the “Goliath” role and the targeted organization is the “David,” it does 
anecdotally appear that communities are also reacting to the 
overreaching nature of the trademark claims.284 
3. Credible Shamers
The last condition, that the shamers of the trademark bullies be
credible within the community, is also likely present in the nonprofit 
sector.285 Shamers of charitable trademark bullies can include targeted 
279. See Brent Schrotenboer, Livestrong Adjusts to Life without Lance Armstrong, USA 
TODAY SPORTS (May 4, 2016, 8:25 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/cycling/2016/05/04/livestrong-cancer-lance-armstrong-donations/83619386/. 
280. See id. 
281. See Joe O’Connor, Lance Armstrong Doping Scandal Takes Shine Off Yellow Anti-
Cancer Livestrong Bracelets, NAT’L POST (Oct. 19, 2012, at 8:39 PM), 
http://news.nationalpost.com/sports/lance-armstrong-doping-scandal-takes-shine-off-yellow-anti-
cancer-livestrong-bracelets. 
 282.  See, e.g., About, WOMEN FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS, 
http://womenforwoundedwarriors.org/about/ (below the copyright line on the “About” page, “In 
light of the recent accusations surrounding Wounded Warrior Project, we’d like to acknowledge that 
we are in no way affiliated with their organization. 100% of funds donated to Women for Wounded 
Warriors is used to aid wounded veterans and their families.”) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
283. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 671. 
284. See Gayle A. Sulik, Susan G. Komen for the Cure® Sells out the Pink to Get the Green, 
OUPBLOG (Jan. 24, 2011), https://blog.oup.com/2011/01/komen/. 
285. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 674. 
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small charitable organizations, news media, independent “watch dog” 
organizations, celebrities, and community members.286 Effective 
shaming does require this last condition, as the community needs to 
believe in the shamer in order to turn its back on the trademark bully. 
This is perhaps where the targeted charitable organization can be more 
assertive in framing the shaming themselves instead of allowing others 
to do so for them. This not only ensures that the shaming is effective, but 
that it also remains responsible. Uploading the cease-and-desist letter, 
having founders talk to media, and tweeting about the bullying are all 
ways that the targeted organization can take charge of the shaming. If 
the targeted organization allows for others to shame the charitable 
trademark bully, the shaming may not be effective (depending on who 
takes charge of the shaming), and it may not remain responsible. 
Irresponsible shaming can cause a backlash syndrome, where the 
targeted organization is also accused of not acting within shared legal 
norms of appropriate behavior. 
In sum, responsible shaming can be an effective, cost-efficient, 
non-legal tool that small charitable organizations can use to defend 
themselves against trademark bullying, just like small businesses and 
individuals. If a social media post by a targeted organization goes viral, 
there is no telling how quickly the bullying can end.287 
IV. CONCLUSION
While many charitable organizations attempt to show restraint in 
their trademark enforcement efforts, there are times when they cross the 
286. See, e.g., Home, CHARITY WATCH, www.charitywatch.org (reviewing how well 
charitable organizations are living up to their mission based how donations are spent) (“ We dive 
deep to let you know how efficiently a charity will use your donation to fund the programs you want 
to support.”) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
287. See, e.g., Jean Hopfensperger, Lawsuits for the Cure?, STAR TRIBUNE, (Jun. 1, 2011,
9:44 AM), http://www.startribune.com/lawsuits-for-the-cure/122911838/ (reporting that the Komen 
Foundation dropped its trademark opposition against “Mush for a Cure” “shortly” after the 
trademark bullying was highlighted). In the for-profit world (but one involving a small business), 
the dispute involving Katy Perry and her claims on “Left Shark,” the viral post-Superbowl XLIX 
sensation, also shows how fast intellectual property bullies drop their enforcement claims once the 
public takes the target’s side. See Staci Zaretsky, Katy Perry’s Biglaw Firm Sends out ‘Left Shark’ 
Cease & Desist Letter, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 6, 2015, at 11:55 AM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2015/02/katy-perrys-biglaw-firm-sends-out-left-shark-cease-desist-letter/ 
(reporting on the Left Shark dispute). Katy Perry’s law firm sent the cease-and-desist letter to 
Fernando Sosa on February 5, 2015. Professor Sprigman, who represented Mr. Sosa, sent his 
response on February 9, 2015 and as of the date of this article, Fernando Sosa’s Etsy shop is still 
featuring the Left Shark figurine. See id. (posting the cease-and-desist letter and Professor 
Sprigman’s response); Fernando Sosa’s Profile, ETSY.COM, https://www.etsy.com/shop/amznfx 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
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line. In fact, the current legal environment appears to encourage this 
charitable trademark bullying. The negative externalities stemming from 
charitable trademark bullying are quite serious. A reduction in the 
number of charitable organizations working in the same area would 
mean that complementary services are reduced or forgone. Additionally, 
a reduction in the number of organizations altogether would mean that 
larger organizations have a de facto monopoly on the causes that society 
should fund, and therefore, care about. Both would harm society deeply 
at the micro and macro levels. I argue that we should tweak some 
pleading requirements in relation to trademark infringement lawsuits to 
hopefully lessen the number of lawsuits brought, and in turn, lessen the 
extra-judicial charitable trademark bullying. I further argue that 
responsible shaming of charitable trademark bullies would be an 
effective tool for targeted organizations to use to fight back due to the 
amplified vulnerability of charitable organizations to shaming and the 
connected communities. All of these steps, taken together, should allow 
charitable organizations to focus on their missions and to better society 
for all of us. 
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